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"[O]ur dying is more a concern to those who survive us than to ourselves .
I. A PRELUDE TO LIFE AND/OR DEATH
A hearse may not come equipped with a luggage rack, but it cer-
* J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
John Gaubatz, whose guidance helped make this project possible; my father Stephen, whose
editing helped make this Note readable; and most of all, my wife Olivia, whose encouragement
enabled me to achieve my potential.
1. THOMAS MANN, THE MAGIC MOUNTAIN 522 (John E. Woods trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1995) (1924). Because death "does not apply to us at all, but at best [applies] to nature and the
world at large," this Note endeavors - and I urge the reader - to "contemplate it with composure
[and] indifference." Id.
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tainly has room for much legal baggage. Death disbands the marital
union,' dissociates business partners,3 and dissolves certain commercial
entities.4 It abridges the agent's scope of authority,5 abbreviates the
annuitant's stream of income,6 and discharges the secondary obligor's
guaranty.7 Death tolls a statute of limitation,8 terminates a tortfeasor's
2. See, e.g., UNi. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 201 (1973) (identifying "death" as one of
the means by which "[a] marriage may be... dissolved ... as provided by law"). Tangentially,
"the obligation to pay future maintenance [to a former spouse] is terminated upon the death of
either party," id. § 316(b), whereas "provisions for the support of a child are [not] terminated by
... the death of a parent obligated to support the child." Id. § 316(c).
3. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 601(b)(6), 6A U.L.A. 52 (2001) ("A person is
dissociated from a limited partnership as a limited partner upon ... the person's death ...."); id.
§ 603(7)(a) ("A person is dissociated from a limited partnership as a general partner upon ... the
person's death ...."); UNIF. P'SHip ACT § 601(7)(i), 6 U.L.A. 94 (1997) ("A partner is dissociated
from a [general] partnership upon the occurrence of. .. the partner's death ...."); cf, e.g., UNIF.
LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 601(8)(i), 6A U.L.A. 472 (1996) ("A member is dissociated from a limited
liability company upon the occurrence of... the member's death ....").
4. See, e.g., UNIF. P'sHiP ACT § 801(2)(i), 6 U.L.A. 189 (1997) ("A partnership [for a
definite term or particular undertaking] is dissolved, and its business must be wound up... within
90 days after a partner's dissociation by death ...."); UNIF. P'smp ACT § 31(4), 6 U.L.A. 370
(1914) ("Dissolution is caused ... [b]y the death of any partner ....").
5. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 3.07(1) (2006) ("The death of an individual
agent terminates the agent's actual authority."); id. § 3.07(2) ("The death of an individual
principal terminates the agent's actual authority."); id. § 3.11 cmt. b ("A principal's death ... does
not by itself or automatically end the agent's apparent authority."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
AGENCY § 123 (1958) (the death "of one of two or more joint principals terminates the authority
of an agent to act on their joint account," just as the death "of one of two or more agents
authorized to act only jointly terminates the authority of the survivor"). But cf RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) AGENCY § 3.13(2) (2006) ("[Nleither a power given as security nor a proxy . .. is
terminated by ... (d) death of the holder of the power or proxy, unless the holder's death
terminates the interest secured or supported by the power or proxy; or (e) death of the creator of
the power or proxy, if the power or proxy is given as security for the performance of a duty that
does not terminate with the death of its creator.").
6. Cf, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8345(c) (1996) ("[T]he annuity of a retired [federal] employee ...
terminates on the day of death .... The annuity of a survivor terminates on the last day of the
month before death ...."); UNIF. PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT § 13(a), 14 U.L.A. 95
(1990) ("[L]iability to a claimant for periodic [judgment] payments not yet due for medical
expenses terminates upon the claimant's death."); id. § 13(c) ("[Ilf a judgment for periodic
payments provides payment to more than one claimant entitled to receive benefits for future
damages and one or more but fewer than all of them die, the surviving claimants are entitled to
shares proportionate to their shares in the periodic payments not yet due .... ). Generally, an
annuity that specifies an expiration date does not terminate when the annuitant dies prior thereto.
4 AM. JUR. 2D Annuities § 7 (2006). If the instrument "shows an intention that payments shall be
personal to the beneficiary," however, the right to future income "will not pass to the annuitant's
estate upon ... her death before the expiration of such period." Id.
7. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) SUR. & GUAR. § 16 (1996) (where a continuing
guarantor "agrees to be a secondary obligor for all future obligations of the principal obligor to the
obligee ... the continuing guaranty is terminated by the death of the continuing guarantor").
8. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-109 (amended 1998), 8 U.L.A. 44 (1969) ("No statute
of limitation running on a cause of action belonging to a decedent ... shall apply to bar a cause of
action surviving the decedent's death sooner than four months after death."); id. § 3-802(b) ("The
running of a statute of limitations measured from an event other than death or the giving of notice
to creditors is suspended for four months after the decedent's death, but resumes thereafter ....").
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civil liability,9 and abates an appellant's criminal conviction.'" It divests
freehold, " leasehold, 12 and equitable interests in property;' 3 and occa-
sions the delimitation,'" valuation,' 5 and taxation of the decedent's
9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 900(l)(a) (1979) ("A cause of action for a tort
may be discharged by ...the death of either party, in the absence of a statute providing for
survival of the cause of action .... "); id. § 926 ("Under statutes providing for the survival or
revival of tort actions ... (a) the death of the injured person limits recovery for damages ... to
harms suffered before the death, and (b) the death of the tortfeasor terminates liability for punitive
damages."); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) ("If a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties. . . . Unless [a] motion for
substitution is made not later than 90 days after the death . . . , the action shall be dismissed as to
the deceased party.").
10. See Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971) (per curiam), overruled on other
grounds, Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976), cited with approval in United States v.
Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 413-16 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[D]eath pending direct review of a
criminal conviction abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the prosecution from
its inception.").
11. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) PROP. § 18 (1936) ("An estate for life is an estate which
is not an estate of inheritance ...."); 7 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 52.05[2] (Michael A. Wolf
ed., 2005) ("[T]he death of a spouse holding as tenant by the entirety terminates the tenancy and
leaves the survivor vested solely with the fee simple interest . . . she previously held
concurrently."); id. § 51.03[3] ("[T]he estates of deceased joint tenants have no interest.").
12. See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Death of Lessee as Terminating Lease,
42 A.L.R. 4TH 963 (1985). Although the lessee's death during a term-of-years tenancy does not
generally terminate the lessee's obligations, the lessee's death during a tenancy at will is
considered an exercise of her option to unilaterally terminate the leasehold. See id.
13. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 55(1) (2003) ("If the interest of a deceased
beneficiary of a trust does not terminate or fail by reason of the beneficiary's death, the interest
devolves by will or intestate succession in the same manner as a corresponding legal interest.");
id. § 69 cmt. a (if by testamentary bequest or intestate succession "the entire beneficial interest in
trust property passes to the trustee, the trust terminates and the trustee holds the property free of
trust"); id. § 69 cmt. b (if by testamentary bequest or intestate succession "the legal title to the
trust property passes to the beneficiary who has the entire beneficial interest, merger occurs, the
trust terminates, and the beneficiary holds the property free of trust"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
PROP.: SERVrrUDES § 4.3(3) (2000) ("A servitude benefit or burden that is personal lasts no longer
than the life of the person holding the benefit or burden."); UNIF. CUSTODIAL TRUST ACT § 2(e),
7A U.L.A. 246 (1999) ("[Tjhe custodial trust terminates on the death of the beneficiary.");
RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) TRUSTS § 143(2) (1935) ("If two or more beneficiaries of a trust are joint
tenants of the beneficial interest and one of them dies, his interest does not devolve upon his heir
or next of kin or devisee or legatee, but the survivor or survivors are entitled to the whole
beneficial interest, unless it is otherwise provided by statute.").
14. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2033 (2003) ("[T]he gross estate shall include ... all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
PROP.: WILLS & DON. TRANS. § 1.1(a) (1999) ("A decedent's 'probate estate' . .. consists of
property owned by the decedent at death and property acquired by the decedent's estate at or after
the decedent's death."). But see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 368 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6324 ("If the debtor dies during the [pendency of a bankruptcy] case, only property
exempted from ... the [bankruptcy] estate or acquired by the debtor after the commencement of
the case and not included as property of the [bankruptcy] estate will be available to the
representative of the debtor's probate estate.").
15. See, e.g., § 2031(a) ("The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including ...the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated."). But see § 2032(1) ("In the case of property ... disposed off ]
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estate.16 Death transfers title to takers-in-waiting, 17 triggers the disbur-
sal of survivor benefits,18 and effectuates the harvest of donated
organs.' 9 It excuses performance of contractual duties,2" extinguishes
rights to statutory entitlements,2' and deems exercisable powers of
within 6 months after the decedent's death, such property [may, if the executor so elects,] be
valued as of the date of ... disposition."); § 2032(2) ("In the case of property not ... disposed of
within 6 months after the decedent's death, such property shall be valued as of the date 6 months
after the decedent's death."); § 2032(3) ("Any interest or estate which is affected by mere lapse of
time shall be included at its value as of the time of death (instead of the later date) with adjustment
for any difference in its value as of the later date not due to mere lapse of time.").
16. See, e.g., § 2001(a) ("A tax is ... imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of every
decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States."); § 6075(a) ("Returns made under
section 6018(a) (relating to estate taxes) shall be filed within 9 months after the date of the
decedent's death."); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6012-3(b)(1) (2002) ("The executor or administrator of the
[decedent's] estate ... shall make the return of income required in respect of such decedent. For
the decedent's taxable year which ends with the date of his death, the return shall cover the period
during which he was alive.").
17. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-101 (amended 1998), 8 U.L.A. 380 (1969) ("Upon the
death of a person, his real and personal property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by
his ...will or to those indicated as substitutes for them in ... circumstances affecting the
devolution of testate estate[s;] or in the absence of testamentary disposition, to his heirs or to those
indicated as substitutes for them in ... circumstances affecting [the] devolution of intestate estates
...."); UNIF. DISPOSITION OF CMTY. PROP. RIGHTS AT DEATH ACT § 3, 8A U.L.A. 128 (1971)
("Upon death of a married person, one-half of [any community] property ... is the property of the
surviving spouse and is not subject to testamentary disposition by the decedent or distribution
under the laws of succession .... One-half of that property is the property of the decedent and is
subject to testamentary disposition or distribution under the laws of succession .... ); see also 7
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 51.03[3] (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2005) ("[T]he decedent's death
automatically vests his or her share of [joint-tenancy] property - known as the survivors' accretive
interest - in the remaining joint tenants .... ); id. § 52.05[2] ("[T]he death of a spouse holding as
tenant by the entirety ... leaves the surviv[ing spouse] vested solely with the fee simple interest
he or she previously held concurrently.").
18. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101 (amended 1998), 8 U.L.A. 430 (1969) ("[A]n
insurance policy, contract of employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, certificated or
uncertificated security, account agreement, custodial agreement, deposit agreement, compensation
plan, pension plan, individual retirement plan, employee benefit plan, trust, conveyance, deed of
gift, marital property agreement, or other written instrument of a similar nature [may include] a
written provision that.., money or other benefits due to, controlled by, or owned by a decedent
before death must be paid after the decedent's death to a person whom the decedent designates
.... .).
19. See, e.g., UNF. ANATOMICAL Gnr ACT § 2(e), 8A U.L.A. 24 (1987) ("An anatomical gift
by will takes effect upon death of the testator, whether or not the will is probated."); id. § 8(c)
("[A] technician may remove any donated [body] parts ... after determination of death by a
physician or surgeon.").
20. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 262 (1981) ("If the existence of a
particular person is necessary for the performance of a duty, his death . . . is an event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made."); id. § 48 ("An
offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree or offeror dies .... "); id. § 332(2)
("[A] gratuitous assignment is revocable and the right of the assignee is terminated by the
assignor's death ...."); see also U.C.C. § 3-504(a)(ii) (2002) ("Presentment for payment or
acceptance of [a negotiable] instrument is excused if ... the maker or acceptor ... is dead ....").
21. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 407.27(a) ("An individual's entitlement [to Supplemental Medical
Insurance ("S.M.I.")] ... ends on the last day of the month in which the individual dies."); 20
2007] WANTED! DEAD AND/OR ALIVE
appointment.22 The validity of testamentary gifts depends upon who is
alive when the testator dies;23 resolving conflicts of law depends upon
where the decedent was domiciled while she was alive; 24 culpability for
criminal homicide depends upon when 25 and how2 6 the victim died.
Historically, one's passing from life proved a reliable condition
precedent for effecting change in legal rights and relations. It was
marked by a precise moment in time - an articulo mortis predicated
upon the quaint notion that death is both inevitable and incontrovert-
ible. 27  Yet determining (or, if you will, deciding) whether and when
death has occurred is no longer an easy undertaking.2 8 Conflicting legis-
C.F.R. § 416.1334 ("Eligibility for [Supplemental Security Income ("S.S.I.")] benefits ends with
the month in which the recipient dies. Payments are terminated effective with the month after the
month of death.").
22. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS & DON. TRANS. § 17.4 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 2006) ("A testamentary power of appointment becomes presently exercisable upon, but not
before, the donee's death."). But see, e.g., id. § 19.11 ("If the donee dies before the effective date
of a document purporting to confer on the donee a power of appointment, the power is not created,
and any attempted exercise of the power is ineffective.").
23. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS & DON. TRANS. § 1.2 (1999) ("An
individual who fails to survive the decedent cannot take as an heir or a devisee."); id. § 15.3 ("[A]
beneficiary of a postponed multiple-generation class gift who fails to survive the distribution date
is excluded from the class."); UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH Acr § 2, 8B U.L.A. 148 (1993) ("[I]f
the title to property, the devolution of property, the right to elect an interest in property, or the
right to exempt property, homestead or family allowance depends upon an individual's
survivorship of the death of another individual, an individual who is not established by clear and
convincing evidence to have survived the other individual by 120 hours is deemed to have
predeceased the other individual.").
24. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 260 (1971) ("The devolution of
interests in movables upon intestacy is determined by the law that would be applied by the courts
of the state where the decedent was domiciled at the time of his death."); id. § 263(1) ("Whether a
will transfers an interest in movables and the nature of the interest transferred are determined by
the law that would be applied by the courts of the state where the testator was domiciled at the
time of his death."); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-401 (amended 1998), 8 U.L.A. 139 (1969) ("Rights
to homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance ... are governed by the law of
the decedent's domicile at death."). But see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 240(1) (1971) ("A will insofar as it devises an interest in land is construed in accordance with
the rules of construction of the state designated for this purpose in the will."); id. § 264(1) ("A
will insofar as it bequeaths an interest in movables is construed in accordance with the local law of
the state designated for this purpose in the will.").
25. See, e.g., Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230, 239 (1894)
("[N]o person should be adjudged, 'by any act whatever, to kill another, who does not die by it
within a year and a day thereafter ... '). But see Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 463 (2001)
("The year and a day rule is widely viewed as an outdated relic of the common law.... For this
reason, the year and a day rule has been legislatively or judicially abolished in the vast majority of
jurisdictions recently to have addressed the issue.").
26. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (1962) ("A person is guilty of criminal homicide if
he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of another human being.").
27. See generally DOUGLAS N. WALTON, ON DEFINING DEATH: AN ANALYTIC STUDY OF THE
CONCEPT OF DEATH LN PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICAL ETHICS (1979) (exploring how the boundary of
life expands and contracts with shifting definitions of death).
28. See Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1980) ("[W]e are
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lative responses to the uncertainties posed by biomedical technology
contravene the formerly inviolate axiom that a person is legally dead
simply because she is perceived to have died.29 Because of the varied
degrees by which various jurisdictions define death and direct its diag-
nosis,3" it is now possible for a person to be simultaneously dead and
alive pursuant to the laws of State X and State Y respectively.31 In other
words, it is not impossible to statutorily resurrect a "putative decedent"
from State X merely by applying the laws of State Y, or to statutorily
make moribund a "potential decedent" from State Y simply by applying
the laws of State X.32
on the threshold of new terrain - the penumbra where death begins but life, in some form,
continues.").
29. See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-1107 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-101 (1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7180 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-136 (West 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19a-504a (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1760 (2005); D.C. CODE § 7-601 (1982);
§ 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 83B101 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1819 (1981); 755
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/10 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (West 1986); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 77-205 (1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.400 (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:111 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811 (1983); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-
202 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1033 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145.135 (West 1989); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (West 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005
(West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-7202 (1992); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (West 1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:6A-3 (West 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (West 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 90-323 (West 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.3-01 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30
(West 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.300
(West 1997); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10203 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16 (1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-43-460 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-18.1 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 68-3-501 (1982); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon 1995); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 26-34-2 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1981); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 869
(1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1 (West 1989); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-19-101 (1985).
30. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180(a) (West 1982) ("An individual who has
sustained . . . irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions . . . is dead."
(emphasis supplied)), with VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972(A) (2004) ("A person shall be medically
and legally dead if... there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and spontaneous cardiac
functions .... " (emphasis supplied)); compare OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (West 1982)
("[D]eath has occurred . . . [if] the irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain has
occurred." (emphasis supplied)), with WiS. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1998) ("An individual
who has sustained ... irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain
stem, is dead." (emphasis supplied)).
31. This Note differentiates between "medical death" and "legal death." Because most death
laws minimally require that a determination thereunder conform to accepted medical standards,
any person who may be deemed "legally dead" may also be diagnosed "medically dead." Many
statutes, however, confine death's legal definition to the physiological indicia enumerated therein.
See infra Part IV.B.2.b. Consequently, a person who may be diagnosed "medically dead" may not
necessarily be considered "legally dead."
32. At first blush, this unsavory possibility might appear (at least) unlikely or (at most)
unrealistic. Yet, congressional investigations into "the ethical and legal implications of . . .
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The annals of academia are rich in debate as to which medical defi-
nition of death should apply in particular clinical circumstances, yet few
have reduced to brass-tacks how death's legal definition impacts the
average attorney and her clients. Are death laws symmetrical? In other
words, is the congery of end-of-life situations covered by one jurisdic-
tion's codification equivalent with that of another? Or, is there statutory
asymmetry, namely, circumstances where identical end-of-life scenarios
are dissimilarly addressed by different legislative models? Are death
laws harmonious? Put another way, do statutes based upon theoretically
analogous grounds generate congruent results? Or, is there medico-legal
discord; that is, occasions where individuals with identical physiological
conditions are differently deemed dead by divergent legislative enact-
ments? Or even socio-anthropological incompatibility; predicaments
where our societal preconceptions of life suggest that a person should
(or should not) be alive, but a concomitant determination is foreclosed -
or an inapposite determination is mandated - by the controlling stat-
ute?33 These questions are founded upon a general inquiry, which
although deserving of comprehensive analysis, has thus far received
scant attention: how does the corpus of American death laws operate as
a system?34
To be sure, the current state of American death law epitomizes an
antinomy of state death laws. This legislative disagreement, however, is
not necessarily disagreeable. For the creative practitioner, inconsistent
definitions of death offer a "decedent-to-be," as well as her "soon-to-be
survivors," an array of starting-points from which to launch the legal
defining death, including the advisability of developing a uniform definition" thereof, Pub. L. No.
95-622, § 1802(a)(1)(B), 92 Stat. 3439 (1978), concluded that "it is possible to think of medical
situations - and, even more freely, of legal cases that would be unlikely but not bizarre - in which
the differences in statutory language could lead to different outcomes." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING
DEATH: A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF
DEATH 72 (1981) [hereinafter DEFINING DEATH] (emphasis supplied), available at http://www.
bioethics.gov/reports/past-commissions/defining-death.pdf.
33. A person steeped in the normative debate over legislating death is apt to wince upon
considering the mere plausibility of such medico- and socio-anthropological dilemmas. On the
one hand, it is difficult to imagine that our statutory regime for regulating death would (or, even
could) militate against our common understanding of life. On the other hand, every statute that
regulates death necessarily vitiates our preconception of life insofar as it is inconsistent with the
legislature's opinion of what it means to be dead. Indeed, "[a] word or phrase defined in a statute
• . . has the meaning expressed in its definition and therefore that meaning prevails over other
meanings." UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT § 2 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 483 (1995 & Supp. 1996)
(emphasis supplied).
34. In 1978, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research canvassed then-recent legislative and judicial treatments of
death. See generally DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32. Yet, the medico-legal landscape has
experienced a sea change over the past quarter century - all but one state legislature have
amended their definition of death since. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979).
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machinery that a determination of death ignites. And, because each
alternative is endowed with unique advantages and disadvantages, a
comprehensive estate planning strategy might sensibly integrate calcu-
lated end-of-life tactics that ensure the favorable application (or avoid
the undesirable applicability) of a particular jurisdiction's definition.35
This Note assesses the legal, ethical, and financial implications of such
maneuvers - an evaluation informed by (1) investigating the evolution
of modern death jurisprudence, (2) categorizing death statutes based
upon their conceptual underpinnings, and (3) examining the impact
divergent death laws have upon different legal interests.36
In the final analysis, however, the desirability of statutorily resur-
recting a "putative decedent" from State X merely by applying the laws
of State Y, or of statutorily making moribund a "potential decedent"
from State Y simply by applying the laws of State X, depends upon the
desirability of her being deemed to have died in the first instance. Thus,
the prescient legal advisor must answer a critical question as to each
client: whether and when, in the context of this person's particular
objectives, would deeming her legally dead "seem[ ] the best thing to
35. Because it is possible for a person to be simultaneously dead and alive pursuant to the
laws of State X and State Y respectively, relocating a "soon-to-be-decedent" from one state to
another is the most obvious expedient for invoking a particular jurisdiction's death laws. The
Uniform Probate Code, however, affords a significantly less disruptive, private-ordering
alternative. Section 2-703 empowers a testator to designate that "the law of a particular state"
shall govern "[t]he meaning and legal effect" of her will "without regard to the location of
property covered thereby." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-703 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 186 (1969);
accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 240(1) (1971); id. § 264(1). It would thus
appear that a domiciliary of State X could legitimately incorporate a choice-of-law provision that
ensures the term "death" will be interpreted "in accordance with [State Y's] rules of construction
.... " Id. § 264 cmt. e (commenting that "[w]hen the testator designates the law of a state as the
applicable law in matters of construction, it is to be inferred that he intends the local law of that
state to govern" regardless of whether the forum "ha[s] a substantial relationship to the testator or
his estate"). Consequently, if a domiciliary of State X is not legally dead pursuant to the laws of
State Y, and also has a will which instructs that its "meaning and effect" shall be governed by the
laws of State Y, then probating her will or administering her estate would be impermissible - even
though she might be legally dead according to the laws of State X. Cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE art.
III gen. cmt. (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 26 (1969). Indeed, "[p]ost-mortem probate of a will must
occur to make [it] effective" and "appointment of a personal representative . . . after the
decedent's death is required," id., to issue the letters testamentary that commence administration.
See id. §§ 3-103 to -104. Conversely, if a domiciliary of State Y is legally dead pursuant to the
laws of State X, and also has a will which instructs that its "meaning and effect" shall be governed
by the laws of State X, then probating her will and administering her estate would be permissible -
even though she might be legally alive according to the laws of State Y. See id. §§ 3-103 to -104.
36. CAUTION: THE INTENDED FOCUS OF THIS NOTE IS TO FAMILIARIZE ITS READER WITH
STATE STATUTES THAT LEGISLATE THE DEFINITION AND DETERMINATION OF DEATH. I NEITHER
PURPORT NOR ATTEMPT TO CONSIDER REPORTED CASES THAT HAVE EITHER INTERPRETED SUCH
LEGISLATION OR ADDRESSED RELATED QUESTIONS. ACCORDINGLY, THE READER IS ADVISED TO
CONSULT RELEVANT CASE LAW WITHIN HER JURISDICTION FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE.
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II. THE DEATH OF COMMON LAW DEATH
At common law, death was defined by negative implication as "the
opposite of life."38 Centuries of scholarship variously summarized this
tautology,39 yet the weight of mainstream authority converged upon two
easily observable and universally familiar touchstones, namely, a perma-
nent absence of bloodflow and breathing. 40  Over time, tribunals sum-
moned to adjudicate matters of "alive" versus "dead" regularly relied
upon, and regurgitated in haec verba, the archetypical formulation
adopted by Black's Law Dictionary:
4
'
Death. The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physi-
cians as a total stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessa-
tion of the animal and vital functions consequent thereon, such as
respiration, pulsation, etc.42
37. Roger B. Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. L.J. 623, 636 (1973). "Although death is a
single phenomenon, there are multiple ways in which it may be determined." Maria K. Clark,
Solving the Kidney Shortage Crisis Through the Use of Non-Heart-Beating Cadaveric Donors:
Legal Endorsement of Perfusion as a Standard Procedure, 70 IND. L.J. 949 n.6 (1995).
Therefore, one cannot thoughtfully investigate the "death definition problem" without first asking,
"[w]hat difference does it make whether somebody is dead?" Dworkin, supra at 629. This
inquiry "places the issue of death into the only posture in which it can be of relevance to the law -
the posture of context or consequences." Id. For, "[w]hatever may be the needs of the
philosopher or the ethicist, the lawyer needs only to know what consequences follow upon a given
determination." Id.
38. See, e.g., Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86, 90 (N.Y. 1872).
39. See David J. Powner et al., Medical Diagnosis of Death in Adults: Historical
Contributions to Current Controversies, 348 LANCET 1219 (1996) (reviewing the varied means by
which society has defined, diagnosed, and determined death at various points throughout history).
40. See David W. Meyers, Time of Death: Medicolegal Considerations, 16 AM. JUR. PROOF
OF FACTS 2D Proof of Facts 87, § 2 (2005).
41. A "dictionary-dependent" death jurisprudence emerged in 1898, when the California
Supreme Court adverted to Bouvier's definition of "[nlatural death [as] the cessation of life."
Slevin v. Bd. of Police Pension Fund Comm'rs of S.F., 55 P. 785, 786 (Cal. 1898); see, e.g., In re
Schmitt's Estate, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 273 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968) ("[tlhis Court considers
death as defined in Black's Dictionary" because "[that] is [the definition] used by the California
courts"); Thomas v. Anderson, 215 P.2d 478, 481-82 (Cal. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1950) ("As defined
in Black's Law Dictionary, 3d Edition, death is the cessation of life; the ceasing to exist ....");
Schmidt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120, 133 (Mo. 1961) ("Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., defines
death as '[t]he cessation of life; the ceasing to exist ....'); Sanger v. Butler, 101 S.W. 459, 462
(Tex. Civ. App. 1907) ("The Encyclopcedic Dictionary, among others, gives the following
definitions of [death]: 'The state of being dead; the act or state of dying; the state or condition of
the dead.' The Century Dictionary defines death as 'cessation of life; that state of a being, animal
or vegetable, in which there is a total and permanent cessation of all the vital functions.').
42. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed., rev. 1968). This cardiopulmonary-centric
definition, which was adopted by the last "pre-death-legislation era" edition of Black's Law
Dictionary, was subsequently revised by the first "post-death-legislation era" edition to encompass
a broader conception: "Death. The cessation of life; permanent cessations of all vital functions
and signs." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (5th ed. 1979). Consistent with its displacement of
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Because a doctrinaire judiciary was reluctant to deviate from this lexical
shibboleth, jurisdictions amassed a corpus of case law couched in
cardiopulmonary terms.4 3 The law seldom had occasion to question the
propriety of the tried-and-true vital signs, until recently - when modem
medicine's increased facility to perpetuate life convoluted the traditional
notion of its complement.44
During the first half of the twentieth century, the effective use of
biomedical technology 45 to assist patients otherwise incapable of sponta-
the exclusively heart-lung definition, the 1979 edition included an additional entry under the
heading "brain death." Id. at 170. Nevertheless, both listings - genuflecting to the influx of
"statutory definitions ... which include[d] brain-related criteria" - redirected the reader toward
pertinent legislation for further guidance. Id. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180
(1976) and the statutory definition codified thereby); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 400 (6th
ed. 1990) (citing UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12A U.L.A. 589 (1980) and the
model definition articulated therein). In 1999, however, Black's unexpectedly regressed and
inexplicably reversed thirty years of medico-legal evolution; both the seventh and eighth editions
disposed of any reference to statutory formulations, and each recapitulate a bizarrely truncated
"pre-death-legislation era" definition: "Death. The ending of life; the [perm,,,nt] cessation of all
vital functions and signs." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 406 (7th ed. 1999) (stricken text is
supplied to emphasize words previously included but currently omitted); accord BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 428 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 2004].
43. See Smith v. Smith, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Ark. 1958); In re Schmitt's Estate, 261 Cal.
App. 2d 262, 273 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968) ("[T]his Court considers death ... as the total
stoppage of the circulation of the blood and cessation of the animal and vital functions of the body
such as respiration and pulsation." (internal quotations omitted)); Thomas v. Anderson, 215 P.2d
478, 482 (Cal. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1950) ("[D]eath occurs precisely when life ceases and does not
occur until the heart stops beating and respiration ends."); State v. Johnson, 395 N.E.2d 368, 372-
73 (Ohio 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("[D]eath means the permanent cessation of all vital functions
and the fact and time of its occurrence are questions for a jury."); In re Myers, 4 Ohio Law Abs.
11, at *5 (C.P. 1925), available at 1925 WL 3007 ("'Death.' Briefly is cessation of life; that
state of a being animal or vegetable, in which there is a total and permanent cessation of all vital
functions.").
44. See Barber v. Super. Ct., 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
("[M]odern medical technology . . . has caused our society to rethink its concepts of what
constitutes 'life' and 'death.'"); Swafford v. State, 421 N.E.2d 596, 598 (Ind. 1981) ("[U]ntil
recent medical history, no reason existed for the traditional medical definition of death detailed in
Black's Fourth Edition to engender legal controversy."); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 656 (N.J.
1976) ("Developments in medical technology have obfuscated the use of the traditional definition
of death."), abrogated by In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (N.J. 1985); N.Y.C. Health & Hosp.
Corp. v. Sulsona, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (N.Y. Special Term 1975) ("[T]here presently exists a
discrepancy between the common law criteria for determining death . . . and the medically
recognized concept of 'brain death."'); State v. Johnson, 395 N.E.2d 368, 371 (Ohio 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) ("Advances in medicine during the past several decades have rendered suspect the[]
traditional criteria of death."); In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 734 (Wash. 1980) ("Until recently,
the definition of death was both medically and legally a relatively simple matter .... With the
recent advancement of medical science, the traditional common law 'heart and lungs' definition is
no longer adequate.").
45. Examples of biomedical technology that assist patients who are unable to spontaneously
sustain circulation or respiration include: mechanical ventilators, cardiac pacemakers, and heart-
lung machines. See Meyers, supra note 40, § 1. A "mechanical ventilator" is used to mimic
natural breathing by intermittently exerting either the negative or positive pressure necessary to
inflate the lungs, which then self-deflate by gravitational pull. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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neously sustaining circulation and respiration challenged the medico-
legal practicality of defining death solely on the basis of cardiopulmo-
nary functions.46 This impracticality was especially evident where such
natural mechanisms could be, or were in fact being, mechanically substi-
tuted within a clinical setting.47 Indeed, physicians were uncertain how
to even classify an artificially-supported patient who appeared to be
alive (because she continued breathing, had a heartbeat, and was "warm
to the touch") inasmuch as she appeared to be dead (because she lacked
consciousness and failed to respond either cognitively or reflexively to
external stimuli).48
By the 1960s, developments in organ transplantation exacerbated
the fissure between lagging legal principles and evolving medical proce-
dures.4 9 On the one hand, surgical best practices called for a donor's
vital functions to be artificially maintained until the moment organs
were extracted; at which point life support systems were disconnected,
circulation and respiration ceased, death was declared, and the harvest
proceeded.5 ° On the other hand, the common law diagnosed this "heart-
beating organ donor" as legally alive - and, thus, deemed her murdered
- when cardiopulmonary support was intentionally disconnected.5
MEDICAL DEVICES AND INSTRUMENTATION 2848 (John Webster ed., 1988). A "pacemaker" is
used to supply - by either external (i.e., transcutaneous) or internal (i.e., implantable) placement -
the periodic electrical impulses necessary to stimulate a heart in which the natural pacing
mechanism has failed. See generally id. at 2175. A "heart-lung machine" is used as either a
short-term (i.e., surgical) or long-term (i.e., sustainable) substitute for both cardiac and respiratory
functions. See generally id. at 1440.
46. See Meyers, supra note 40, § 1.
47. When it became evident that "biological" and "mechanical" death did not necessarily
occur simultaneously, medical commentators proposed that the alternative concepts be
distinguished and discretely defined. See id. § 6 n.36.
48. See Alexandra K. Glazier, "The Brain Dead Patient Was Kept Alive" and Other
Disturbing Misconceptions; A Call for Amendments to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 9 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 640, 642 (2000).
49. See Thomas R. Trenkner, Annotation, Tests of Death for Organ Transplant Purposes, 76
A.L.R. 3D 913 (2005) ("[A] growing number of medical and legal commentators [have] argu[ed]
that the reliability of [the traditional cardiopulmonary] criteria has been rendered suspect by...
the demonstrated ability of transplant recipients to go on living after their vital organs have been
removed and replaced by those of another, and.., that the traditional definition... minimizes the
possibilit[y] of successful organ transplantation by discouraging physicians, due to their fear of
possible civil or criminal liability, from removing donors' organs until after respiration and
heartbeat have ceased and the organs have begun to deteriorate ....").
50. See INST. OF MED., NON-HEART-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: MEDICAL &
ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROCUREMENT 26 (1997) (describing "intense pressure" for maintaining a
"short interval" between declaring a donor's death and procuring her "vital organs"); James M.
DuBois, Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donation: A Defense of the Required Determination of Death,
27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 126, 127 (1999).
51. See What and When Is Death, 204 JAMA 219 (1968). The Journal of the American
Medical Association ("JAMA") aptly framed the "heart-beating organ donor" dilemma in a 1968
editorial: "If ... [vital] organs are taken long after death, their chance of survival in another
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:871
Over the following decade, the medico-legal complications that
accompanied this parade of horribles incited cross-disciplinary interven-
tion.52 The medical community responded in 1968 by reifying physio-
logical benchmarks for ascertaining brain death53  - additional
neurological criteria that adapted the customary heart-lung definition "to
account for the 'changed conditions' that a dead body may be attached
to a machine so as to exhibit demonstrably false indicia of [somatic]
life."54 A corresponding reformation of the anachronistic legal dogma,
however, would not gain traction until 1970, when Kansas pioneered the
first statutory reformulation of death.5
III. THE BIRTH OF STATUTORY DEATH
A. The Kansas Statute and Its Progeny
Kansas' "Act Relating to and Defining Death" foreshadowed many
of the hallmarks of its current-day counterparts: two alternative defini-
tions that are applicable "for all purposes ... any laws to the contrary
notwithstanding. 56 The first definition codified the traditional cardio-
pulmonary standard, to wit, an "absence of spontaneous respiratory and
cardiac function[s]. 57 Unlike the common law, however, the Kansas
person is minimized. On the other hand, if they are removed before death can be said to have
occurred by the strictest criteria that one can employ, murder has been done." Id. This latter point
resonated with criminal defendants, many of whom decried that intervening clinical procedures
constituted supervening causes of a homicide victim's death. See generally David B. Sweet,
Annotation, Homicide by Causing Victim's Brain-Dead Condition, 42 A.L.R. 4TH 742 (2006).
52. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 6 ("If death were entirely a medical matter, the
process of 'redefinition' might have been left in the hands of the health professions .... But,....
the standards by which death is determined have significance and consequences that are not
limited to medical ones.").
53. See Ad Hoc Comm. of the Harvard Med. Sch. to Examine the Definition of Brain Death,
A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 337 (1968). A 1968 report by the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death formulated a
triad of physiological criteria for establishing the permanent loss of brain functions, a condition
the Committee referred to as "irreversible coma": (1) non-receptiveness to external stimuli; (2)
lack of musculation; and (3) nonexistent reflexive response. Id.
54. People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286, 295 (N.Y. 1984).
55. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (repealed 1984), amended by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205
(1984).
56. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (repealed 1984) ("A person will be considered
medically and legally dead if... based on ordinary standards of medical practice, [(1)] there is the
absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function... [; or] ... [(2)] there is the absence of
spontaneous brain function .... ), amended by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984), with VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004) ("A person shall be medically and legally dead if ... based on the
ordinary standards of medical practice, [(1)] there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and
spontaneous cardiac functions ... ; or ... [(2)] there is the absence of brain stem reflexes,
spontaneous brain functions and spontaneous respiratory functions ....").
57. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (repealed 1984), amended by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205
(1984).
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statute identified "the time these functions ceased" as the culmination of
death,58 required that a determination thereof be "based on ordinary
standards of medical practice," and restricted such diagnoses to circum-
stances where "attempts at resuscitation [were] considered hopeless.""
The alternative formulation embraced the then-nascent neurological cri-
teria, defined death as "the absence of spontaneous brain function," and
deemed it to occur "at the time when such conditions first coin-
cide[d]." 6° Similar to its cardiopulmonary analogue, a neurological
diagnosis was confined to situations where "further attempts at resusci-
tation or supportive maintenance [would] not succeed."'"
Aside from provoking a cacophony of criticism that "public bodies
and laymen ...ha[d] no role to play in this process of change," the
Kansas statute spawned a succession of model acts and variations
thereof.62 Within ten years nearly half of the United States had appro-
priated one of five legislative prototypes for defining and determining
death: (1) the formulation codified by the State of Kansas;6 3 (2) a refine-
ment thereof proposed by Professors Capron and Kass;' (3) the Model
Definition of Death Act prepared by the American Bar Association
("ABA");65 (4) the Model Determination of Death methodology
advanced by the American Medical Association ("AMA");66 and, (5) the
Uniform Brain Death Act ("UBDA") recommended by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL").6 7
Some were politically debated and formally adopted by legislative
enactment.68 Others were deliberated in camera and merely decreed by
58. Id. At common law, time of death was a question of fact to be established by expert
medical testimony and to be determined by a jury. See, e.g., Tucker v. Lower, I Va. Cir. 124 (Va.
Cir. Ct. 1972) ("[Iln determining the time of death, [the jury] could consider in addition to the
traditional evidence ... the time of complete and irreversible loss of all function of the brain; and,
whether or not the aforesaid functions were spontaneous or were being maintained artificially or
mechanically.").




62. Alexander M. Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for
Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87, 92 (1972).
63. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (repealed 1984), amended by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205
(1984).
64. Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 109-17. The 1972 Capron-Kass proposal was
subsequently, and substantively, revised by Professor Capron in 1978. Alexander M. Capron,
Legal Definition of Death, 315 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 349, 356 (1978).
65. Section of Insurance, Negligence, and Compensation Law, 100 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 231-32
(1978).
66. 243 JAMA 420 (1980) (emphasis supplied).
67. UNW. BRAIN DEATH AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1978 & Supp. 1996).
68. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 65-66. By 1980, seven states had codified
indigenous legislation that did not track any particular exemplar, another seven followed the
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judicial fiat. 69 Each, however, made incrementally more likely the unsa-
vory possibility that a person might satisfy one state's broad definition
of death, yet simultaneously fail to satisfy a sister-state's narrowly
drafted formulation.
Legal commentators immediately recognized a minefield of medi-
cal, legal, and ethical pitfalls in this oblique state of affairs. First, unlike
most areas of the law - where "provisions that diverge from one state to
the next create, at worst, inconvenience" - legal uncertainty concerning
death had a viscerally "jarring effect."7 Second, textual inconsistencies
hindered "the process of statutory enactment" because lawmakers - con-
fronted with a smorgasbord of alternatives absent "clear explanation of
the significance of their differences" - were increasingly "wary of all
the choices" before them.7" Attending to these realities, Congress con-
vened an interdisciplinary public body in 1978 (under the auspices of the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research) to investigate the "implica-
tions of. . . defining death, including the advisability of developing a
uniform definition" thereof.72
B. The Uniform Determination of Death Act
Although modern medicine ambitioned the law to reexamine its
understanding of life, 73 efforts to unify the various articulations of its
absence were energized by practical necessity and administrative conve-
Capron-Kass proposal, five adhered to the ABA model, four paralleled the Kansas statute, two
adopted the UBDA, and none accepted the AMA methodology. Id.
69. See, e.g., Lovato v. Dist. Ct. Tenth Jud. Dist., 601 P.2d 1072, 1081 (Colo. 1979) (en banc)
("[I]n the absence of legislative action... [and] until otherwise changed legislatively or judicially,
we adopt the provisions of the proposed Uniform Act."); Swafford v. State, 421 N.E.2d 596, 601-
02 (Ind. 1981) (with "no statute to guide us ... we are unable to ignore the advances made in
medical science and technology" and "hold that ... death ... may be established by proof of the
irreversible cessation of... total brain functions"); Commonwealth v. Golston, 366 N.E.2d 744,
748 (Mass. 1977) ("[A]lthough Black's Law Dictionary does not have the force of a statute or
even a judicial decision .... its assertion that death is 'defined by physicians' in a certain way
does not freeze the medical definition for all time .... "); N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp. v.
Sulsona, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686, 691 (N.Y. Special Term 1975) ("[Tlhe context in which the term
'death' is used in . . . the Public Health Law implies a definition consistent with the generally
accepted medical practice of doctors primarily concerned with effectuating the purposes of this
statute."); In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 738 (Wash. 1980) (en banc) ("[N]o statute in this state
has been enacted to define what constitutes death .... It is both appropriate and proper, therefore,
that this court ... adopt the provisions of the Uniform Determination of Death Act .
70. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 72.
71. Id. at 73 (emphasis in original).
72. Pub. L. No. 95-622, § 1802(a)(1), 92 Stat. 3439 (1978).
73. The NCCUSL identified several reasons for the disconnect "between current and accepted
biomedical practice and the common law." UNiF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr prefatory note,
12A U.L.A. 589 (1980 & Supp. 1996). The Commissioners were most troubled, however, by the
inconsistency between the traditional benchmark for determining death (i.e., "an absence of
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nience.74 Indeed, the President's Commission not only opined that
"developments in medical treatment necessitate[d] a restatement of the
standards .. . for determining" death, but also posited that "such a
restatement ought preferably ... be a matter of statutory law ... uniform
among the several states."75 In 1980, the NCCUSL embodied these con-
clusions in the Uniform Determination of Death Act ("UDDA")7 6 - a
legislative model to replace the countless conflicting formulations and,
thereby, "ease the enactment of good law on death throughout the
United States."77
The NCCUSL was mindful of the confusion engendered by a dec-
ade-long proliferation of patchwork state laws.7 8 Nevertheless, the
Commissioners perceived that the discordant ensemble of antecedent
statutes resounded the "legislative need" to conflate "accepted biomedi-
cal practice and the common law."'79 To this end, the UDDA enumer-
ates two alternate definitions of death that "reflect the continuity of the
traditional [heart-lung] standard and the newer brain-based standard":8"
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A
determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted
medical standards.81
spontaneous respiratory and cardiac functions") and biomedical technology that could artificially
maintain heart and lung activity long after brain functions had irreversibly ceased. Id.
74. The Law and Medicine Committee of the ABA explained that:
The advantages of [a] simple direct definition are that it: permits judicial
determination of the ultimate fact of death; permits medical determination of the
evidentiary fact of death; avoids religious determination of any facts; avoids
prescribing the medical criteria; enhances changing medical criteria; enhances local
medicine practice tests; . . . covers both civil and criminal law; covers current
American judicial decisions; [and] avoids nonphysical sciences.
Frank J. Veith, Brain Death and Organ Transplantation, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 416, 430
(1978).
75. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 1.
76. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, prefatory note.
77. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 73.
78. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Actr, supra note 73, prefatory note.
79. Id.
80. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 74.
81. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr, supra note 73, § 1. It is helpful to annotate the
UDDA's definition as a first-order logic proposition: (Ca(x) A R,(x)) v (N,(x) A Sa(x)) - D(x). Cf
id. In this regard, "x" represents an "individual"; "C." represents an "irreversible cessation of
circulatory functions, as determined in accordance with accepted medical standards"; "R."
represents an "irreversible cessation of respiratory functions, as determined in accordance with
accepted medical standards"; "N." represents an "irreversible cessation of neocortical functions, as
determined in accordance with accepted medical standards"; "S." represents an "irreversible
cessation of brain stem functions, as determined in accordance with accepted medical standards";
and "D" represents "death."
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A plain reading of this statute reveals the characteristic traits it inherited
from its decisional and positive law ancestry.82
Part (1) codifies the classic cardiopulmonary indicia of somatic
death - a person is dead if her heart and lung functions have ceased and
neither can be restored nor replaced. 3 Despite the NCCUSL's predic-
tion that "the overwhelming majority of cases w[ould] continue to be
determined" by this time-honored criterion, its continued exclusivity
belied the Commissioners' commitment to ensuring the continual legal
recognition of medical innovations.84 Accordingly, and to expand upon
the common law's narrowly circumscribed confines, Part (2) integrates a
neurological definition as an alternate basis for defining death - a person
is brain dead if both her higher- and lower-brain have permanently
ceased to generate purposeful activity."
The UDDA's brain-based alternative is derived from the Act's
predecessor, the UBDA. 6 Under the UBDA, a person was considered
to be dead if she "sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning of
the brain, including the brain stem . ,,87 Under the UDDA's modified
language, however, an individual who "sustain[s] ... irreversible cessa-
tion of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is
dead."88 At first blush, this minor reformulation might appear to be a
distinction without a difference. Yet by requiring a permanent loss of
82. Compare UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 1, with KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 77-202 (repealed 1984), amended by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984), and In re
Schmitt's Estate, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 272-73 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968). Although a plain
reading of the UDDA is useful for purposes of tracing the Act's genealogy, more is required to
construe and apply the UDDA in practice. First, the meaning of a word or phrase "is determined
by its context, the rules of grammar, and common usage," unless it "is defined in the statute" or
has "acquired a technical or particular meaning in [the] particular context" of the statute being
construed. UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 483 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
Moreover, Section 2 of the UDDA mandates that the Act "be applied and construed to effectuate
its general purpose to make uniform the law ... among states enacting it." UNIF. DETERMINATION
OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 2.
83. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § l(1).
84. Id. prefatory note.
85. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 1(2). The human brain
comprises three anatomic divisions: (1) the cerebrum; (2) the cerebellum; and (3) the brain stem.
See generally David R. Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 850
(1986). Because the cerebrum primarily controls consciousness and cognition, it is traditionally
referred to as the "higher brain"; whereas the brain stem, which controls spontaneous and
vegetative functions, is referred to as the "lower brain." See id. Concomitantly, modem medicine
distinguishes between (A) "partial-brain death," the impairment of one or two anatomic divisions;
and (B) "whole-brain death," the loss of functions in all three divisions. See id.
86. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, prefatory note (noting that the
UDDA is based in part on the UBDA); UNIF. BRAIN DEATH ACT, supra note 67, § 1 (defining
death in terms of the quantum and quality of neurological activity).
87. UNIF. BRAIN DEATH ACT, supra note 67, § I (emphasis supplied).
88. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 1(2) (emphasis supplied).
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functions throughout the "entire brain," a concept that embodies all
three anatomic divisions,89 the NCCUSL reaffirmed that neocortical
(i.e., partial-brain) indicia should remain "[in]valid medical or legal
bases for determining death."9 Moreover, by recasting the phrase "ces-
sation of all functioning" as "cessation of all functions," the NCCUSL
intimated that only "cellular activity [which] is organized and directed
... is [ ]relevant in judging whether the [brain], as opposed to its com-
ponents, is dead."'"
To normalize the practical task of making this judgment, the Act
complements its physiological definitions of death with procedural
guidelines for diagnosing its occurrence.92 Most of the UDDA's prede-
cessors likewise demanded compliance with clinical practices "that
ha[d] passed the normal test of scrutiny and adoption by the biomedical
community."93 Because each statutory model was benchmarked against
a different standard of care,94 however, even slight textual differences
proved ample fodder for hindsight-biased assessments - despite that a
physician might have "act[ed] in good faith and according to the norms
of professional practice and belief."95 To minimize this uncertain expo-
sure to liability, the UDDA clarifies that a determination thereunder
need only conform with "accepted medical standards. 96 And no person
89. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
90. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, prefatory note. The term
"neocortical death," also known as "partial-brain death," encompasses "the terms 'persistent
vegetative state,' 'noncognitive state,' 'apallic syndrome,' [and] 'cerebral death' . ... Smith,
supra note 85, at 850 n.6. This condition is characterized by a loss of central nervous system
activity and a failure to maintain homeostasis; that is, a lack of "self-awareness" and an inability
"to respond behaviorally in any major or appropriate way to the environment." Id. Under the
UDDA-rejected definition of neocortical death, therefore, a person who manifests neither
consciousness nor cognition - the sine quibus non of higher-brain activity - is dead
notwithstanding the continued presence of brain stem functions. Cf. id. Because a partially brain-
dead person maintains brain stem activity, however, she would not be considered dead under the
UDDA's whole-brain standard. Cf. id.
91. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 75.
92. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 1.
93. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 78.
94. The formulation proposed by Kansas, and the refinement thereof by Professors Capron
and Kass, mandated that a determination of death be "based on ordinary standards of medical
practice." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (repealed 1984) (emphasis supplied), amended by KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984); Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 108-11 (1972). The Model
Definition of Death Act prepared by the ABA prescribed that death be defined "according to usual
and customary standards of medical practice." Section of Insurance, Negligence, and
Compensation Law, supra note 65, at 231-32 (1978) (emphasis supplied). The AMA's Model
Determination of Death methodology required that a diagnosis of death be "made in accordance
with accepted medical standards." 243 JAMA 420 (1980) (emphasis supplied). The UBDA,
recommended by the NCCUSL, directed that death be determined "in accordance with reasonable
medical standards." UNu'. BRAIN DEATH ACT, supra note 67, § I (emphasis supplied).
95. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 78.
96. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 1. In other words, compliance
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who does so, the NCCUSL commented, "should, or will be, liable for
damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal
proceeding for his acts or the acts of others based on that determina-
tion."97 As for which diagnostic tests are "accepted" for the purpose of
differentiating the living from the dead, however, the UDDA (like the
UBDA before it) is silent.98
Consistent with the UDDA's designation of a general legal stan-
dard for determining death - rather than a delimitation of the specific
medical procedures by which to do so - the Act's objective is to articu-
late death in its broadest definitional sense.9 9 The UDDA's actual util-
ity, however, is surprisingly limited. First, it is simply inoperative
where a person maintains at least circulatory, or respiratory, or higher-
brain, or lower-brain function(s). 00 Second, the official comments
expressly disclaim that "[t]ime of death . . . is not specifically
addressed" by the Act.' Third, the UDDA "does not concern itself
with living wills, death with dignity, euthanasia, rules on death certifi-
cates, maintaining life support beyond brain death in cases of pregnant
women or of organ donors, and protection for the dead body."'0 2 For
most practical purposes, then, the Act speaks to a relatively narrow
range of possible situations within the universe of plausible scenarios
where the distinction between life and death is blurred. Because the
balance of "these subjects are left [for] other law" to decide,'0 3 forty-
seven jurisdictions have since codified indigenous answers to the univer-
sal questions of whether and when a person has died." °
with the UDDA standard is not confined merely to "universally adopted" practices, but instead,
contemplates any methodology that "has been accepted by a substantial and reputable body" of
practitioners. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 79.
97. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, prefatory note.
98. See id; UNF. BRAIN DEATH ACT, supra note 67, prefatory note. The NCCUSL sought to
ensure the continual legal recognition of, rather than create statutory shackles for, medical
innovations. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT, supra note 73, prefatory note. For this
reason, the Commissioners opted not to freeze the UDDA at the then-current level of "scientific
sophistication or biomedical technology." DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 61. Instead, the
Act merely designates "the standards by which death is to be determined and leave[s] to experts in
biomedicine the continuing development of criteria and specific tests that fulfill them." Id.
99. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT, supra note 73, prefatory note ("This Act provides
comprehensive bases for determining death in all situations.").
100. Id. § 1; see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
101. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, prefatory note ("Time of death is a
fact to be determined with all others in each individual case, and may be resolved, when in doubt,
upon expert testimony before the appropriate court.").
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The NCCUSL has subsequently referenced
and reiterated the UDDA's statutory text in other Uniform Acts. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 1-107(1) (amended 1998), 8 U.L.A. 30 (1969) ("Death occurs when an individual [is determined
to be dead under the Uniform Determination of Death Act] [has sustained either (i) irreversible
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IV. LIFE AND/OR DEATH UNDER THE UDDA
To be sure, all death laws are invariably anchored in the adjective
fundamentals of the UDDA; each represents a statutory "guide [for]
those who will decide whether (and if so, when) a person has passed
from being alive to being dead."1 1 5 Nevertheless, and notwithstanding
our societal judgments of whether a particular person should (or should
not) be dead, these legislative responses are far from substantively uni-
fied. In other words, and in per capita terms, the law imposes several
related meanings of death upon fifty-one percent of Americans and
numerous disparate meanings upon the remaining forty-nine percent. 0 6
A. The Taxonomy of Contemporary Death Laws
Similar to other instances where uniform or model act speaks to a
particular subject matter, the fifty-one United States jurisdictions may be
bifurcated into discrete classes: (1) jurisdictions that have officially
adopted the UDDA; and (2) jurisdictions that have not officially adopted
the UDDA. As for the former, thirty-two state legislatures and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have officially adopted the UDDA.1 °7 As for the lat-
ter, eighteen have not. 10 8 It is not unusual, however, for lawmakers to
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or (ii) irreversible cessation of all functions of
the entire brain, including the brain stem. A determination of death must be made in accordance
with accepted medical standards].") (explaining that the first set of bracketed language is for use
by states that have adopted the UDDA, whereas the second set of bracketed language is for use by
states that have not adopted the UDDA).
105. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 55; UNIT. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note
73, prefatory note.
106. Based upon the U.S. Census Bureau's July 2005 state population estimates. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, POPULATION ESTIMATES, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/estimates.php (last
visited Apr. 1, 2007); see infra fig.2.
107. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT, supra note 73, gen. notes; see also ALA. CODE
§ 22-31-1 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-101 (1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180
(West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-136 (West 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1760
(2005); D.C. CODE § 7-601 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-
1819 (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811 (1983); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202 (West 1998);
MIcu. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1033 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.135 (West 1989);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (West 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-22-101 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-7202 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007
(West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (West 1993);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.3-01 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (West 1982); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.300 (West 1997); 35 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 10203 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-
460 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-18.1 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-34-2 (2007); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1981); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1 (West 1989); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-19-101 (1985).
108. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1107 (1994); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (West 1984); § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 327C-1 (1998); 5 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/10 (West 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
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"substantially adopt the major provisions of a Uniform Act and, yet,
depart from the official text" by either substituting, omitting, or adding
to the model's original language. 0 9 Hence, four second-tier categories
may further be distinguished: (1)(A) jurisdictions that have officially
adopted the UDDA as originally drafted by the NCCUSL; (1)(B) juris-
dictions that have officially adopted the UDDA, but with substantive
modifications thereto; (2)(A) jurisdictions that have not officially
adopted the UDDA, but have codified native death legislation; and
(2)(B) jurisdictions that have neither officially adopted the UDDA nor
codified native death legislation.110 In this regard, fourteen states and
the District of Columbia have adopted the UDDA in its original form," I
eighteen have adapted an abbreviated or augmented analog thereof," 2
fourteen have codified death laws of indigenous origin," 3 and four have
no such legislation whatsoever." 4
Although all forty-seven statutory models fit neatly into one of
these four taxonomic categories, each codification has a distinctive tex-
§ 446.400 (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-3 (West
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1982); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West
2004); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (1982). As of March 1, 2006, Iowa, Massachusetts, New York,
and Washington have neither legislated criteria for defining death nor codified the standards for
determining its occurrence.
109. UNiF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, prefatory note.
110. See infra fig.2.
111. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-101 (1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFERY CODE § 7180 (West
1982); D.C. CODE § 7-601 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 2811 (1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (West 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.3-01 (1989); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.300 (West 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-460 (2006); S.D. CODIFED
LAWS § 34-25-18.1 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-34-2 (2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1
(West 1989); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-19-101 (1985).
112. See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-136 (West 1981);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1760 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 54-1819 (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (West 1986); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-
202 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1033 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145.135 (West 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-7202
(1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (West 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (West 1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (West 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 1986); 35
PA. STAT. ANN. § 10203 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 5218 (1981).
113. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1107 (1994); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (West 1984); § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 327C-1 (1998); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/10 (West 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.400
(West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-3 (West 1991); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1982); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West 2004); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1982).
114. As of March 1, 2006, Iowa, Massachusetts, New York, and Washington have neither
legislated criteria for defining death nor codified the standards for determining its occurrence.
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ture - a product of the extent to which its provisions attempt to legislate
and, thereby, actually regulate death." 5  How effectively a particular
model does so hinges upon the unique characteristics of two mainstay
constituents: (i) definitional components; and (ii) determinative compo-
nents.1 16  The first imbue substantive medical meaning to the term
"death," whereas the second impart procedural legal standards for deter-
mining its occurrence. Both, however, are integral to regulating "the
practical task of determining whether a person has died.""' 7 Accord-
ingly, a balanced appraisal of any death law is informed by an examina-
tion of each component in the context of its composite elements: (i)(a)
definitional applicability; (i)(b) definitional focus; (i)(c) definitional
indicia; (ii)(a) determinative prerequisites; (ii)(b) determinative involve-
ment; and (ii)(c) determinative criteria.
B. The Anatomy of Contemporary Death Laws:
Definitional Components
1. DEFINITIONAL APPLICABILITY
Evaluating the scope of a death law's purview enables the
addressee to anticipate what medico-legal events might follow from a
person's satisfying the codified definition." 8 This analysis, however,
assesses more than just the degree to which a determination of death
could affect one's legal rights and relations; it also furnishes insight into
the drafting body's normative sentiment towards the extent to which
death should be legislated. The nine statutes that either explicitly or
implicitly address this issue span four increments of definitional applica-
bility, ranging from broad to narrow.
115. See Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 102. Professors Capron and Kass identified four
distinct "levels of 'definitions"' for legislating death: "(1) the basic concept or idea; (2) general
physiological standards; (3) operational criteria; and (4) specific tests or procedures." Id.
Because of the likelihood that operational criteria and specific tests might change "with advances
in biomedical knowledge and refinements in technique," the President's Commission favored, and
the UDDA reflects, the second definitional level (i.e., general physiological standards). DEFINING
DEATH, supra note 32, at 1; UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT, supra note 73, prefatory note
("The medical profession remains free to formulate acceptable medical practices and to utilize
new biomedical knowledge, diagnostic tests, and equipment.").
116. This dichotomy is exemplified by the UDDA. Cf UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT,
supra note 73, § 1. The Act's first sentence speaks to defining death (i.e., "An individual who has
sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2)
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead."). Id.
The Act's second sentence speaks to determining death (i.e., "A determination of death must be
made in accordance with accepted medical standards."). Id.
117. See Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 102.
118. Examples of the medico-legal events that might follow from a person's satisfying a
statutory definition of death include: pronouncing and recording death, harvesting and
transplanting organs, autopsy and burial, probate and devolution, etc. See id. at 104.
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The broadest sense of definitional applicability is exemplified by
the Maryland statute's proviso that it "shall be used for all purposes."'"19
Although the phrase "all purposes" is undoubtedly capacious, 20 it does
little to circumscribe the definition's actual reach - unless one construes
the phrase "all purposes" in the context of the narrower language other
jurisdictions employ to cabin the use of their respective statutes. For
example, the New Mexico legislation specifies its tripartite applicability
"[f]or all medical, legal and statutory purposes."' 2'1 In contrast,
Nevada's definition may be used for both "legal and medical pur-
poses";122 Missouri's, solely "for legal purposes."'' 2 3  Surprisingly, all
four of these articulations, each with a descending degree of applicabil-
ity, embody official adoptions of the UDDA12 4 - whose statutory text
does not specify its definitional applicability.' 25 Rather, the NCCUSL
prefatorily notes that the Act is intended to "provide[ ] comprehensive
bases for determining death in all situations."' 126
On the one hand, it is semantically intuitive to infer that an all-
purpose definition may, afortiori, be applied for any legal, medical, or
statutory purpose. On the other hand, it is not logically sound to con-
clude that an all-purpose definition may only be used for these three
reasons. Presumably the circumstances that implicate death's definition
themselves implicate more than just legal, medical, and statutory
needs. 127 What are the other possible purposes, then, for which an all-
purpose definition could apply? Alternatively, what are the illegitimate
purposes for which a definition so restricted must not be employed?
Because these questions are not unique to the "all purposes" context,
their answers may be culled by a more focused investigation.
Connecticut's statutory definition, for example, is applicable only
"for purposes of making a determination concerning the continuation or
119. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-201 (West 1982); accord HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1
(1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West 2004).
120. When used as an adjective to modify a plural subject, the word "all" means "the entire
number of ... individual components of' the plural subject "without exception." 1 OxFoRD
ENGLISH DicIONARY 324 (2d ed. 1989).
121. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (West 1993).
122. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (West 1985); accord § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987).
123. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982); accord Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.400 (West
1986).
124. UNIF. DETERmINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, gen. notes.
125. See id. § 1.
126. Id. prefatory note (emphasis supplied).
127. Examples of other needs implicated by circumstances that implicate death's definition
include: anthropological, biological, deontological, diabolical, emotional, epistemological, ethical,
familial, financial, philosophical, political, practical, psychological, sociological, teleological,
theological, etc.
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removal of any life support system."' 128 While there are innumerable
reasons for withholding or withdrawing life support,129 its active admin-
istration and willful termination generally are embraced by definitions
that may be applied "for medical purposes."' 130 The Connecticut articu-
lation, therefore, also admits of an alternative, and dramatically less
restrictive, construction. One could frame a colorable argument that a
nuanced interpretation of the clause "for purposes of making a determi-
nation" contemplates any purpose germane to end-of-life decisionmak-
ing - a veritable artist's palette of purposes limited only by the
attorney's creativity and imagination. 3 '
More troublesome than these ambiguities concerning the applica-
bility (or inapplicability) of a single definition, is the medico-legal
uncertainty engendered by Illinois' numerous definitions of a single
term. Pursuant to Illinois' Health Care Surrogate Act, "'[d]eath' means
• . . there is (i) an irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory
functions or (ii) an irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem." 132 For purposes of organ and tissue
donation, however, the Illinois legislature has determined that "death"
only "means . . . the irreversible cessation of total brain function."' 33
Unquestionably, the law is no stranger to defining a single word in vari-
ous ways, with differing definitions befitting different applications. 34
"One wonders, however, whether it does not appear somewhat foolish
for the [same state] to offer a number of arbitrary definitions of [this]
natural phenomenon . , Case in point, the bizarre interplay
between Illinois' alternatively applicable statutes apparently requires
that Irma Illinoisan (an organ donor who manifests only a permanent
cessation of heart-lung activity) be deemed legally alive, 136 but arguably
permits Irving Illinoisan (a non-donor who exhibits identical physiologi-
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (West 1984).
129. See supra note 127.
130. See, e.g., § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (West 1985);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (West 1993); cf HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1998); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-201 (West 1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West 2004).
131. Cf CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (West 1984).
132. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 40/10 (West 1998) (emphasis supplied). Although this
definition of death is evocative of the UDDA articulation, Illinois has not officially adopted the
UDDA. See UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT, supra note 73, gen. notes.
133. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 50/1-10 (West 2004).
134. For example, the verb "enjoin" means both "[flo legally prohibit or restrain" as well as
"[t]o prescribe, mandate, or strongly encourage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 2004, supra note
42, at 570. Likewise, the verb "sanction" means both "[tlo approve, authorize, or support" as well
as "[t]o penalize." Id. at 1369.
135. Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 106.
136. Cf 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 50/1-10 (West 2004).
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cal indicia) to be diagnosed legally dead. 13 7
To be sure, neither jurisdictions with a single definition of
restricted applicability nor those with multiple definitions of different
applicability impose a consistent standard that may be employed in all
end-of-life situations. Rather, both statutory regimes distinguish "differ-
ent 'kinds' of death,"' 13 8 designate "the same person 'dead' for one pur-
pose [yet] 'alive' for another,"1 39 and deem "some people . . . 'more
dead' that others." 140 In so doing, these states effectively vest surrogates
and "soon-to-be survivors" with the authority to legally define a putative
decedent's legal status. So long as a persuasive purpose can be adduced
for determining death vis-A-vis a particular definition, and that purpose
is at least implicitly encompassed by the controlling law's definitional
applicability, then the decedent is (for such purpose) dead.' 4'
Naturally, the difficulty of concocting a permissible justification for
applying a given definition is inversely proportional to the expansive-
ness of its purview (i.e., the broader a statute's definitional applicability,
the easier it becomes for one to contrive a permissible justification).
Consequently, it would seem sensible that a terminally ill annuitant
might favor a narrowly applicable death law - under which it should be
relatively more difficult to consider her dead (and, thereby, terminate her
stream of income) than under a broadly applicable definition. 4 Con-
137. Cf id. § 40/10. Although this unseemly allegory might appear apocryphal, it illustrates
the unintended consequences of well-intentioned legislation that overshoots its intended target.
On February 11, 1981, extensive neurological examinations confirmed that Melanie Bacchiochi
had sustained a complete and irreversible loss of neurological activity. See Fred Fabro,
Bacchiochi vs. Johnson Memorial Hospital, 45 CONN. MED. 267 (1981). Yet, because of
uncertainty concerning the applicability of Connecticut's death legislation - a brain-death statute
that, at the time, applied only to organ transplantation - Melanie's physician refused to terminate
life support. See id. "It is ironic," he decried, "that if [Melanie] had been a donor, she could have
[already] been pronounced dead ...and the respirator could have been withdrawn. Dead for
transplantation, but not dead otherwise!" Id. at 268.
138. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 60.
139. Id.
140. Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 106.
141. In Illinois, however, the "putative decedent" arguably retains significant autonomy
concerning how and when she is deemed dead. By granting inter vivos (perhaps, even causa
mortis) consent to post-mortem organ donation, the Illinoisan could significantly limit the
likelihood of opportunistic skullduggery - no longer could her death be determined by applying
the traditional heart-lung definition; only a brain-death standard would suffice. Compare 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 50/1-10 (West 2004) (defining "death," for purposes of organ and tissue
donation, as "the irreversible cessation of total brain function"), with 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 40/10 (West 1998) (defining "death," for purposes of surrogate decisionmaking, as either "(i) an
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or (ii) an irreversible cessation of all
functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem").
142. Cf, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8345(c) (1994) ("The annuity of a retired [federal] employee .
terminates on the day of death .... The annuity of a survivor terminates on the last day of the
month before death ...."); UNIF. PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTs ACT § 13(a), 14 U.L.A. 95
(1990) ("[L]iability to a claimant for periodic [judgment] payments not yet due for medical
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versely, it would seem equally reasonable that an unscrupulous legatee
would benefit by a broadly applicable definition - under which it might
be comparatively easy to declare a "testator-to-be" dead, minimize the
medical expenses associated with maintaining life, and thereby expedite
the maximum potential windfall.'43 Then again, less malevolent kindred
may also favor the broadly applicable definition's flexibility to acceler-
ate a loved one's painful demise, diminish the financial burden of ongo-




Despite their linguistic differences, the definitional components of
each death law imbue the word-symbol "death" with substantive mean-
ing. Yet, the method by which a statute can derive that meaning varies
between one of two semantic alternatives. Four jurisdictions deduc-
tively define a biological occurrence;' forty-three inductively define a
biological condition.'45 Pragmatically, both approaches appropriately
expenses terminates upon the claimant's death."). Generally, an annuity that specifies an
expiration date does not terminate when the annuitant dies prior thereto. 4 AM. JUR. 2D Annuities
§ 7 (2006). If the instrument "shows an intention that payments shall be personal to the
beneficiary," however, the right to future income "will not pass to the annuitant's estate upon...
her death before the expiration of such period." Id.
143. Cf, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-101 (amended 1998), 8 U.L.A. 380 (1969) ("Upon the
death of a person, his real and personal property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by
his ...will or to those indicated as substitutes for them in ... circumstances affecting the
devolution of testate estate[;] or in the absence of testamentary disposition, to his heirs or to those
indicated as substitutes for them in ... circumstances affecting devolution of intestate estates
..... ); UNIF  DISPOSITION OF CMTY. PROP. RIGHTS AT DEATH ACT § 3, 8A U.L.A. 128 (1971)
("Upon death of a married person, one-half of [any community] property ... is the property of the
surviving spouse and is not subject to testamentary disposition by the decedent or distribution
under the laws of succession .... One-half of that property is the property of the decedent and is
subject to testamentary disposition or distribution under the laws of succession ....").
144. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/10 (West 1998); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 446.400
(1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (West 1993).
145. See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-1107 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-101 (1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7180 (West 1982); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-136 (West 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19a-504a (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1760 (2005); D.C. CODE § 7-601 (1982);
§ 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1
(1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1819 (1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (West 1986); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 77-205 (1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811
(1983); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.1033 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.135 (West 1989); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3
(West 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1983); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-7202 (1992); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:6A-3 (West 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-06.3-01 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (West 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:871
distinguish the antecedent question of "when does death occur" from the
consequent inquiry of "has death occurred." Physiologically, however,
only the former actually defines "death," whereas the latter only accu-
rately defines "dead."' 14
6
The UDDA inductively concludes that "an individual who has sus-
tained either (1) . . . or (2) . . . is dead."'4 7 This statutory vantage is
retrospective in nature; it looks backward in time from the moment
where a determination is being made and enables the addressee to infer
that death has already occurred because the decedent currently manifests
certain physiological indicia.148 In other words, the ex post perspective
adopted by UDDA-style legislation "assumes that each dead person
[already] became dead at some moment prior to the time of diagno-
sis."'1 49  In contrast, New Mexico's statutory definition empowers its
addressee to deduce that a living person will later become dead at the
instant when certain conditions precedent are satisfied: "[D]eath occurs
when an individual has sustained either (1) ... or (2) .. . .""' This ex
ante viewpoint looks forward in time, toward a death event that may or
may not have already occurred. 5 '
The distinction between statutes couched in terms of "dead" versus
"death" cannot be underestimated. Unlike the New Mexico legislation,
which fixes a precise articulo mortis, the UDDA does not characterize
this issue as one to be resolved statutorily. 15 2 Rather, the Act merely
§ 3122 (West 1986); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432.300 (West 1997); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10203
(West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-460 (2006); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-18.1 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1982); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-34-2 (2007); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-
10-1 (West 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1982); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-19-101
(1985); accord UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 1.
146. Many scholars assert that death is a biological process - evidenced by the fact that certain
organs may endure warm ischemia and, thereby, survive the death of the host body. DuBois,
supra note 50, at 128-29. Others contend, and the President's Commission concurred, that "death
should be viewed not as a process but as the event that separates the process of dying from the
process of disintegration." See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 77 (quoting James L. Bernat,
Charles M. Culver & Bernard Gert, On the Definition and Criterion of Death, 94 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 389 (1981)).
147. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § I (emphasis supplied). Although
"[h]eadings and titles may not [generally] be used in construing a statute or rule," UNIF. STATUTE
& RULE CONSTR. ACT § 13, 14 U.L.A. 493 (1995 & Supp. 1996), one wonders if the name
"Uniform Determination of Death Act" is not, in fact, a misnomer - a more accurate title being
the "Uniform Determination of Dead Act."
148. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 77.
149. Id.
150. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (West 1993) (emphasis supplied).
151. Cf DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 76-77.
152. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, prefatory note. It could be argued,
however, that the NCCUSL implicitly recanted this position by recapitulating a rephrased version
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inquires "whether death has or has not occurred," and implies that the
moment of its occurrence is a "matter of estimation"'' 53 - a question of
fact "to be determined with all others in each individual case" based
upon "expert testimony before the appropriate court."' 154  Ascertaining
one's time of death, however, not just its onset, is frequently the disposi-
tive factor in establishing legal rights and relations. Consequently, a
lack of statutory consensus regarding when a person has died assures
discomforting uncertainty regarding what it means to have done so.
The viability of one's claim to devolved property, right to exempt
property, or membership status as to a class gift frequently hinges upon
whether the purported taker survived the decedent by a prescribed statu-
tory interval (typically, 120 hours).'55 An insurance beneficiary may not
be entitled to double indemnity unless the insured dies within a desig-
nated time frame following an accident; in fact, a beneficiary may not be
entitled to any proceeds at all if the insured dies before the policy's
exclusionary period has lapsed.'56 Surviving relatives are obligated to
return most statutory benefits they receive subsequent to the recipient's
demise.' 57 Hence, it would seem strategically advantageous for litigants
engaged in such disputes to leverage the UDDA's malleable time-of-
death analysis in order to finesse the moment when the decedent is
deemed to have died.
of the UDDA in the Uniform Probate Code: "Death occurs when an individual ... has sustained
either (i) ... or (ii) .... " UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-107(1) (amended 1998), 8 U.L.A. 30 (1969)
(emphasis supplied).
153. A.L. Moses, Uniform Determination of Death Act Adds Certainty to the Definition of
Death, 16 EST. PLAN. 276, 277 (1989) (quoting John M. McCabe, Legislative Director of the
NCCUSL).
154. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, prefatory note.
155. See UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 2, 8B U.L.A. 148 (1993) ("[I]f the title to
property, the devolution of property, the right to elect an interest in property, or the right to
exempt property, homestead or family allowance depends upon an individual's survivorship of the
death of another individual, an individual who is not established by clear and convincing evidence
to have survived the other individual by 120 hours is deemed to have predeceased the other
individual."); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-107(6) (amended 1998), 8 U.L.A. 30 (1969) ("In the
absence of evidence disputing the time of death stated on a [certified or authenticated copy of a
death certificate], a [certified or authenticated copy of a death certificate] that states a time of
death 120 hours or more after the time of death of another individual, however the time of death of
the other individual is determined, establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the individual
survived the other individual by 120 hours.").
156. See Meyers, supra note 40, § 11.
157. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 407.27(a) ("Entitlement [to Supplemental Medical Insurance
("S.M.I.")] ends on the last day of the month in which the individual dies."); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1334
("Eligibility for [Supplemental Security Income ("S.S.I.")] benefits ends with the month in which
the recipient dies. Payments are terminated effective with the month after the month of death.");
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SSA PUB. No. 05-10008, How SOCIAL SECURITY CAN HELP YOU WHEN A
FAMILY MEMBER DIES (2004), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10008.html ("If the deceased
was receiving Social Security benefits, you must return the benefit received for the month of death
or any later months.").
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From a tax perspective, the extent of a decedent's estate is gener-
ally a function of ownership interests held "at the time of his death,"'158
and the assessment of an estate's component assets is based on their
date-of-death value.' 59 Accordingly, a prescient executor might argua-
bly find safe harbor for decreasing (or, the Internal Revenue Service, its
own loophole for increasing) an estate's taxable base within a fluid time-
of-death determination. 6  Alternatively, a "soon-to-be decedent" whose
time of death can be machinated to occur after 12:01 AM on January 1 of
the following calendar year might profit from a reduction of his taxable
estate by - and donees would enjoy the largesse of - an additional spate
of gratuitous inter vivos transfers excluded from federal gift taxation. 61
Better yet, a "tax-averse-testator" could avoid the federal estate tax alto-
gether by finagling her time of death to occur after 12:01 AM on January
1, 2010 (when the tax is scheduled for repeal) but before 11:59 PM on
December 31, 2010 (when the tax is scheduled for reinstatement).162
158. I.R.C. § 2033 (2003) ("[Tlhe gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.").
159. § 2031(a) ("The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including
• . .the [fair market] value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated."). But see § 2032(a) ("[I]f the executor so elects ... [:] (1) In the
case of property . . . disposed of within 6 months after the decedent's death, such property [may]
be valued as of the date of ... disposition[; and] (2) In the case of property not ... disposed of
within 6 months after the decedent's death, such property shall be valued as of the date 6 months
after the decedent's death .
160. See §§ 2031-2033.
161. Cf § 2503(b)(1). The first cost-of-living adjusted $10,000 in gifts made to each donee
during the calendar year is excluded from "the total amount of [taxable] gifts made during such
year." Id. Where the donor is married at the time of the gift, however, she may effectively double
the annual exclusion (i.e., by making a $20,000 tax-free split-gift from the donor and her spouse to
the donee). See id. § 2513(a)(1) ("A gift made by one spouse to any person other than his spouse
shall ... be considered as made one-half by him and one-half by his spouse."). Moreover, where
both the donor and the donee are each married at the time of the gift, they may effectively
quadruple the annual exclusion (i.e., by making an initial tax-free split-gift of $20,000 from the
donor and her spouse to the donee, and, by making a second tax-free split-gift of $20,000 from the
donor and her spouse to the initial donee's spouse.). Cf id. Thus, by postponing the donor's
death until after January 1 of the following calendar year, the extent to which she may deplete her
taxable estate - with no adverse estate tax consequences - grows eight-fold on a per-donee basis.
Cf id. It should also be noted that the federal estate tax regime, like the federal income tax
scheme, is progressive in nature. See § 2502(a) ("The [gift] tax imposed by section 2501 ... shall
be ... computed under [the rate schedule in] section 2001(c)."). As a result, diminishing the
donor's taxable estate via non-taxable inter vivos gifts, both reduces (on a graduated basis) the
estate's overall tax liability and concomitantly increases the bounty available for testamentary
bequests and devises. See id.
162. Cf § 2210(a) ("[C]hapter [11 of the Internal Revenue Code] shall not apply to the estates
of decedents dying after December 31, 2009."). Of the sweeping changes heralded by the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, the most notable is that "[t]he
estate tax has been repealed for 2010." I.R.S. PUB. No. 950, II, TRODUCrION TO ESTATE AND GirF
TAXES (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p950.pdf. "The provisions for these
changes," however, "are currently set to expire for estates of decedents dying ... after December
31, 2010. Id. In words, because "[t]he estate tax is repealed [only] for decedents dying after 2009
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b. Grammatical Modality
Grammarians define "modality" as "[tihe expression of... present
likelihood or... obligation" conveyed by the "mood" of a verb.163 The
English language, in turn, traditionally recognizes three such moods: 1
(1) the "indicative," a verbal form that denotes a statement of fact; 16 5 (2)
the "imperative," a verbal form that expresses a command; 166 and (3) the
"subjunctive," a verbal form that conveys a suggestion or possibility. 67
Thus, by evaluating "the factuality of what is said" by the drafting legis-
lature (i.e., "its certainty, probability, or possibility") and assessing the
extent of the addressee's "human control over the situation" (i.e., her
"ability, permission .... [or] obligation"), 68 interpreting a death law's
mood enables the addressee to predict the likelihood that a person who
satisfies the codified definition will be deemed legally dead.
Most death laws signal a "deontic" modality; that is, each "involves
the giving of directives" and communicates the extent to which its draft-
ers require conformity therewith. 69 Yet, the mood with which each
statute conveys its requisite degree compliance varies - and, hence, the
requisite degrees of compliance themselves vary - between one of three
alternative constructions. Thirty-seven jurisdictions, as well as the
and before 2011," I.R.S. PUB. No. 559, SURVIVORS, EXECUTORS, AND ADMINISTRATORS (2006),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p559.pdf, "[i]f you don't die on time, your legatees
could lose millions of dollars." Arden Dale, Estate Taxes Flummox Planners, WALL ST. J., Apr.
5, 2007, at D2.
163. SYLVIA CHALKER & EDMUND WEINER, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR
243 (1994).
164. Id. at 247.
165. Id. at 202.
166. Id. at 197.
167. Id. at 381.
168. SIDNEY GREENBAUM, THE OXFORD ENGLISH GRAMMAR 80 (1996).
169. TOM MCARTHUR, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 664 (1992).
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UDDA, express the indicative mood; 17 five, the imperative; 17 another
five, the subjunctive. 172
The California Determination of Death Act, like the UDDA, typi-
fies the indicative mood in pronouncing that "[a]n individual who has
sustained either (1)... or (2) ... ,is dead."' 173 Here, the inflected verb
"is" implicitly substitutes for the modal verb "shall" and, thereby, fore-
closes any possibility of vacillating over whether a person who satisfies
a designated criterion is not alive.' 7" In other words, because "[a]n indi-
vidual who has sustained either (1) .. . .or (2) ... is dead,"'' 75 an
individual who has sustained either (1). . . , or (2).. ." shall be deemed
dead. 176
170. See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-17-101 (1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-36-136 (West 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
24, § 1760 (2005); D.C. CODE § 7-601 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1998); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 54-1819 (1981); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/10 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-
205 (1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811 (1983);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202 (1998); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1033 (West
1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.135 (West 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (West 1981);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (West 1985); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-3 (West 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-2-4 (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.3-01 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30
(West 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.300
(West 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-460 (2006); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-18.1 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1982); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-34-2 (2007); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-
10-1 (West 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1982); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-19-101
(1985); accord UNri. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 1. Because death laws
that incorporate an inflected form of the verb "to be" denote a statement of fact, such models are
cast in the indicative mood. See CHALKER & WEINER, supra note 163, at 202.
171. See IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (West 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.400 (West
1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-7202 (1992); 35 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 10203 (West 1983). Because death laws that incorporate the modal auxiliaries "'[s]hall'
and 'must' express a duty, obligation, requirement, or condition precedent," UNIF. STATUTE &
RULE CONSTR. ACT § 4(a), 14 U.L.A. 485 (1995 & Supp. 1996), and statutes that incorporate the
modal auxiliaries "'may not,' 'must not,' and 'shall not' prohibit the exercise of a power,
authority, privilege, or right," id. § 4(c), such models are cast in the imperative mood. See
CHALKER & WEINER, supra note 163, at 197.
172. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1107 (1994); § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 83B101 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 90-323 (West 1979). Because death laws that incorporate the modal auxiliary "'[m]ay'
confer[ ] a power, authority, privilege, or right," UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT § 4(b), 14
U.L.A. 485 (1995 & Supp. 1996), such models are cast in the subjunctive mood. See CHALKER &
WEINER, supra note 163, at 381.
173. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West 1982) (emphasis supplied); UNIF.
DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 1.
174. Cf UNF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT § 4(a), 14 U.L.A. 485 (1995 & Supp. 1996)
("'Shall' and 'must' express a duty, obligation, requirement, or condition precedent.").
175. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West 1982) (emphasis supplied).
176. Cf id. (emphasis supplied).
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The imperative mood, on the other hand, is illustrated by the Indi-
ana statute's clarification that "[o]nly an individual who has sustained
either (1) . . . or (2) . . . is dead."' 177 In this context, the restrictive
preposition "only" explicitly substitutes for the modal auxiliary "shall
not." In so doing, the Indiana phraseology goes beyond merely elimi-
nating any question as to whether a person who satisfies a designated
criterion is not alive; rather, the statute also confines its definition's
applicability solely to individuals who satisfy at least one of the enumer-
ated criteria.'78 In other words, because "[o]nly an individual who has
sustained either (1) ... ,or (2) ... is dead,"' 79 "[a]n individual who has
[not] sustained either (1) .... or (2) . . ." shall not be deemed dead. 8 °
To be sure, both the California and Indiana articulations communi-
cate that the criteria identified therein are logically sufficient bases upon
which to conclude that a person has already died.'81 The Indiana legis-
lation, however, further conveys that the specified criteria are logically
necessary prerequisites without which one cannot infer that a person is
legally dead.' 82 Consequently, the California statute arguably suggests
that its designations are illustrative, whereas the Indiana codification
clearly expresses that its enumeration is exhaustive. One might ask,
then, what are the non-enumerated (yet medically accepted) criteria that
an Indiana physician is expressly prohibited from considering? Alterna-
tively, what are the other medically accepted (yet not statutorily desig-
nated) criteria that the California act tacitly permits physicians to
evaluate? These questions are not distinctive to death laws cast in the
indicative and imperative moods.
The subjunctive mood is exemplified by Georgia's ambivalent stat-
utory guidance that "[a] person may be pronounced dead ... if... either
(1) .... or (2) ... 1.83 Because the auxiliary verb "'may' . .. merely
177. IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (West 1986) (emphasis supplied).
178. Cf UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. AcT § 4(c), 14 U.L.A. 485 (1995 & Supp. 1996)
("'May not,' 'must not,' and 'shall not' prohibit the exercise of a power, authority, privilege, or
right.").
179. IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (West 1986) (emphasis supplied).
180. Cf id. (emphasis supplied).
181. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (West
1986).
182. See IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3 (West 1986).
183. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16(a) (1992) (emphasis supplied). In point of fact, subsection (c)
elucidates that "[t]he criteria for determining death authorized in subsection (a) . . . shall not
prohibit the use of other medically recognized criteria for determining death." Id. § 31-10-16(c).
Compliance with subsection (a), however, effectively operates as a safe harbor from ex post - and
potentially hindsight-biased - adjudication of the chosen course-of-action's propriety. Id. § 31-
10-16(b) ("A person who acts in good faith in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a)...
shall not be liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal
proceeding for such act.").
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states what is allowed" and does not "ordinarily connote[ ] language of
command,"' 84 it implies the acceptability of its complement (i.e., "need
not"). As such, Georgia's death law simply imparts a legislative aspira-
tion, but does not impose a legal obligation, that individuals who satisfy
an enumerated criterion be deemed dead. 185 In other words, because
"[a] person may be pronounced dead ... if ... either (1) .... or (2)...
,",186 "[a] person [need not] be pronounced dead" even though she "has
sustained either (1) .... or (2) ....
Presumably, it is biophysically impossible for a particular person to
be both biologically dead and biologically alive at the same time. Nev-
ertheless, the Georgia legislature seems to countenance the possibility
that George Georgian (who satisfies Criterion X) may be diagnosed as
alive, whereas Geralyn Georgian (who also satisfies Criterion X) may be
declared legally dead - even if Criterion X is on all fours with the statu-
tory text. 188  This uncertainty regarding one's legal status is not a
uniquely intrastate phenomenon. Consider the interstate comparison of
Carl Californian, Irving Indianan, and George Georgian (each of whom
satisfy Criterion X). If Criterion X is enumerated within the controlling
death law, then both Carl and Irving will necessarily be legally dead,' 89
yet George may be alive. 190 If Criterion X is not statutorily enumerated,
then Carl will likely be alive, 9 ' Irving will necessarily be alive,192 and
George may (but need not) be legally dead.' 93
3. DEFINITIONAL INDICIA
A death law's definitional indicia delineate the physical manifesta-
tions (i.e., symptoms) of the condition being defined. 94 In this regard,
184. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DIcTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 502 (1st ed. 1987).
185. Cf UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT § 4(b), 14 U.L.A. 485 (1995 & Supp. 1996)
(" 'May' confers a power, authority, privilege, or right.").
186. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16(a) (1992) (emphasis supplied).
187. Cf id. (emphasis supplied).
188. Cf GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992). Because the Georgia statute neither requires that
death be determined where the enumerated criteria are satisfied nor precludes such determination
where they are not, the decisions of whether and when a person has died are reposed to the person
making the determination - decisions she is lawfully permitted to make on a case-by-case basis.
Id. Thus, it might be quite sensible for a Georgia domiciliary who desires to lengthen or shorten
her own life, or for anybody who wishes to lengthen or shorten the life of a Georgia domiciliary,
to consider more than just the attending physician's education and experience (e.g., her ethical
proclivities, religious beliefs, and sentiments regarding euthanasia).
189. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
194. This note differentiates between "medical death" and "legal death." Because most death
laws minimally require that a determination thereunder conform to accepted medical standards,
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every jurisdiction that legislatively defines death, except for Arizona,
does so in terms of "certain vital bodily functions, the permanent
absence of which indicates that [a person] is no longer a living human
being."' 95 Forty-three statutes integrate a cardiopulmonary definition of
somatic death as well as an alternate neurological definition of brain
death;' 96 three incorporate only the latter. 97 Nevertheless, the physio-
logical benchmarks used to define each condition - as well as the cir-
cumstances under which either formulation may be applied - vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
a. Cardiopulmonary Indicia
Like Part (1) of the UDDA, and the common law before it, thirty-
eight states and the District of Columbia codify the traditional "irreversi-
ble cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions" criteria for deter-
mining death.' 98 The Louisiana statute, however, breaks from tradition
any person who may be deemed "legally dead" may also be diagnosed "medically dead." Many
statutes, however, confine death's legal definition to the physiological indicia enumerated therein.
See infra Part IV.B.2.b. Consequently, a person who may be diagnosed "medically dead" may not
necessarily be deemed "legally dead."
195. Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 11. Whereas most statutory models articulate the
physiological criteria by which death is defined, the Arizona legislation merely ascribes a singular
diagnostic directive: "[A] determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted
medical standards." ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1107 (1994).
196. See ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-17-101 (1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-36-136 (West 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
24, § 1760 (2005); D.C. CODE § 7-601 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 327C-1 (1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1819 (1981); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/10
(West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § A.I.C. 1-1-4-3 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.400 (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811 (1983); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202 (West 1998); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1033 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.135 (West 1989); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (West 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
22-101 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-7202 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (West
1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (West 1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-06.3-01 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (West 1982); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.300 (West 1997); 35 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 10203.( West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-460
(2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-18.1 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (West 1982);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-34-2
(2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West 2004); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 16-10-1 (West 1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1982); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-19-101 (1985).
197. See § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-3 (West 1991). Presumably, such casus omissi are governed by the common
law rule that death occurs only after "the cessation of all vital functions and signs." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 2004, supra note 42, at 428.
198. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 1(I). The UDDA's definition of
somatic death may be annotated as a first-order logic proposition: (CQ(x) A R,(x)) -* D,(x). Cf id.
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and, instead, defines somatic death as a person's mere inability to "spon-
taneous[ly sustain] respiratory and circulatory functions."' 99 Surpris-
ingly, the subtlety of this caveat belies the severity of its medico-legal
consequences. Whether (and, if so, how) reliance upon artificial life
support will affect one's legal status depends upon the controlling death
law.
The term "spontaneous" is generally used by clinicians to describe
a physiological activity that occurs "without any influence from other
sources." 2°  With this definition in hand,2° ' it becomes evident that the
Louisiana statute permits a person to be deemed dead once her heart has
stopped beating and she has stopped breathing even though both func-
tions could be mechanically substituted.20 2 Because artificial activity
cannot be characterized as "spontaneous," one's inability to self-sustain
cardiopulmonary functions is a sufficient basis upon which to determine
In this regard, 'x" represents an "individual"; "C." represents an "irreversible cessation of
circulatory functions, as determined in accordance with accepted medical standards"; "R."
represents an "irreversible cessation of respiratory functions, as determined in accordance with
accepted medical standards"; and "D," represents "somatic death." Accord ALA. CODE § 22-3 1-1
(2000); ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-101 (1991); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-136 (West 1981); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1760 (2005); D.C. CODE
§ 7-601 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1819 (1981); 755
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/10 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § A.I.C. 1-1-4-3 (West 1986); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.400 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 2811 (1983); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202 (West 1998); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.1033 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.135 (West 1989); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-36-3 (West 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-7202
(1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (1987);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.3-01 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2108.30 (West 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 432.300 (West 1997); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10203 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16
(1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-460 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-18.1 (1990); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1982); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon 1995);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-34-2 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1981); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-10-1 (West 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1982); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-19-101
(1985).
199. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001) (emphasis supplied); accord HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 327C-1 (1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West
2004). The spontaneous impulses to breathe and contract the heart muscle emanate from the brain
stem. See Jack L. Feldman, Neurophysiology of Breathing in Mammals, in HANDBOOK OF
PHYSIOLOGY: A CRITICAL, COMPREHENSIVE PRESENTATION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND
CONCEPTS, SEC. 1: THE NERVOUS SYSTEM, VOL. IV: INTRINSIC REGULATORY SYSTEMS OF THE
BRAIN 473 (Vernon B. Mountcastle et al. eds., 1986); Smith, supra note 85, at 850-51. As a
result, the loss of spontaneous cardiopulmonary functions "are surrogates for the loss of brain
functions." DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 37.
200. 5 J.E. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER S-264 (2005).
201. Cf UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT § 2, 14 U.L.A. 483 (1995 & Supp. 1996) ("[a]
word or phrase that has acquired a technical or particular meaning in a particular context has that
meaning if it is used in that context" by the statute being construed).
202. Cf LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 111 (2001).
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death under Louisiana's spontaneity-salient definition.20 3 This formula-
tion, in other words, prevents a determination of somatic death only if
one's circulatory and respiratory activity can be promptly resuscitated.
In contrast, the District of Columbia's spontaneity-silent definition
implicitly prevents a person from being deemed dead merely because
her heart has stopped beating and she has stopped breathing so long as
either function could be artificially replaced. 2° Surely, if life support
systems could emulate the cardiopulmonary activity that has ceased,
their immediate absence cannot be characterized as "irreversible." Thus,
one's inability to self-sustain circulatory and respiratory functions is, by
itself, an insufficient basis upon which to determine death under a spon-
taneity-silent definition.z 5
Because this inability is, however, a sufficient basis upon which to
determine death under a spontaneity-salient definition,2 °6 it is entirely
possible to deem legally dead an artificially-supported patient who
appears to be nothing but alive (i.e., because she continues breathing,
has a heartbeat, is "warm to the touch," and might even be both con-
scious and lucid). That being said, three of the four (but, only three of
the four) spontaneity-salient models effectively provide that "death shall
not be determined to have occurred ... [w]hen respiration and circula-
tion are [already being] artificially maintained . . . [unless] there is a
total and irreversible cessation of all brain function, including the brain
stem." 207 Notwithstanding this statutory safeguard, however, a life-or-
death discontinuity still remains. A person who "has experienced an
irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory func-
tions," but who has not yet been administered life support will, in the
interim, "be considered dead. 20 8 Consequently, one is left to wonder
whether "a physician ... [who] feels the patient has died and no further
care is warranted" would even be obligated to administer life support in
the first instance - or could be found negligent for not doing so.20 9
Albeit, a large majority of death laws do not map the contours of
203. Cf id.
204. Cf D.C. CODE § 7-601 (1982).
205. Cf id.
206. See supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text.
207. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982); accord HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1998) ("In
the event that artificial means of support preclude a determination that respiratory and circulatory
functions have ceased, a person shall be considered dead if . . . the person has experienced
irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem."); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 111 (2001) ("In the event that artificial means of support preclude a determination
that [circulatory and respiratory] functions have ceased, a person will be considered dead if... the
person has experienced an irreversible total cessation of brain function."). Contra VA. CODE ANN.
§ 54.1-2972 (West 2004).
208. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982).
209. Meyers, supra note 40, § 8.
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life to the spontaneity, vel non, of one's cardiopulmonary activity; most
are only concerned with whether circulatory and respiratory functions
are present, rather than with how they are being (or might be) perpetu-
ated.2 1  This is not to say, however, that heart-lung indicia are an appro-
priate, or even an effective, means by which to define death in all
circumstances. In point of fact, where life support systems are already
in place, a physician might be medically incapable of distinguishing arti-
ficial activity from natural functions in the first instance.
b. Neurological Indicia
To account for the prospect "that a dead body may be attached to a
machine so as to exhibit demonstrably false indicia of [somatic] life,"'2 1
forty-three statutes incorporate neurological criteria for defining
death.21 2 Of these, thirty-seven track Part (2) of the UDDA and,
thereby, deem "[a]n individual who has sustained ... irreversible cessa-
tion of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem," to be
brain dead.213 Only eleven statutes, however distinguish occasions
where this alternate formulation is preferred.214 Consequently, the
210. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
211. People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286, 295 (N.Y. 1984).
212. See infra notes 213-14.
213. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 1(2). The UDDA's definition of
brain death may be annotated as a first-order logic proposition: (Na(x) A S0(x)) -- Db(x). Cf id. In
this regard, "x" represents an "individual"; "N." represents an "irreversible cessation of
neocortical functions, as determined in accordance with accepted medical standards"; "S."
represents an "irreversible cessation of brain stem functions, as determined in accordance with
accepted medical standards"; and "Db" represents "brain death." Accord ALA. CODE § 22-31-1
(2000); ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-101 (1991); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-136 (West 1981); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1760 (2005); D.C. CODE
§ 7-601 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1998); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 54-1819 (1981); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/10 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 1-1-4-3 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811
(1983); Mo. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202 (West 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.1033 (West 1992); Mir. STAT. ANN. § 145.135 (West 1989); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3
(West 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-7202 (1992); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (1987); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2-4 (West 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.3-01 (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 3122 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.300 (West 1997); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10203
(West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-460 (2006); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-18.1 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (West 1982); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 26-34-2 (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1981); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1
(West 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1982); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-19-101 (1985).
214. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (1984); § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.400 (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:111 (2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-3 (West
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (1982);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972
(West 2004).
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"choice between two apparently equal yet different" definitions is fre-
quently (but not invariably) reposed to "the unguided discretion of
physicians. 215
For example, both the Wisconsin and Ohio codifications provide
that death may be defined in terms of an "irreversible cessation of all
functions of the brain, including the brain stem," under any circum-
stance.21 6 Unlike the Wisconsin legislation, however, the Ohio statute
further pronounces that an "irreversible cessation of all functions of the
brain[, including thc brain stem]"2 17 is the only appropriate benchmark
where a person's "respiratory and circulatory functions ...are being
artificially sustained. 218 Because this truncated formulation does not
expressly include - and, in fact, conspicuously elides - specific refer-
ence to the brain stem, a persistently-vegetative patient may arguably be
deemed dead in the minority of like-minded jurisdictions.2 19
The medico-legal implications of this lower-brain lacuna are best
215. Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 112. In Virginia, "[a] person shall be medically and
legally dead if: [(I)] ... there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and spontaneous cardiac
functions ... ; or [(2)] ... there is the absence of brain stem reflexes, spontaneous brain functions
and spontaneous respiratory functions." VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West 2004) (emphasis
supplied). Although it is questionable whether (or even how) one can exhibit spontaneous
respiratory activity absent brain stem functionality, the Virginia statute grants clinicians only
illusory discretion to entirely forego cardiopulmonary diagnoses of death. Cf. id. Because
Virginia's definition of brain death uncharacteristically includes both cardiopulmonary and
neurological components, the physician is effectively precluded from performing a strictly brain-
based diagnosis of death. Cf. id.
216. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1982); accord
UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § 1.
217. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (1982) (stricken text is supplied to emphasize words
included in the primary provision of the Ohio statute but omitted in the secondary provision of the
same statute).
218. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (1982) ("If the respiratory and circulatory
functions of a person are being artificially sustained .... a determination that death has occurred is
made by .. .determin[ing] that the irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain has
occurred." (emphasis supplied)), with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1982) ("An individual is
dead if he has sustained ... irreversible cessation of allfunctions of the brain, including the brain
stem ...." (emphasis supplied)).
219. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (1982); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 67 1.001 (Vernon
1995). Support for this partial-brain interpretation of the Ohio definition is two-fold. First, one
can infer that the legislature intentionally omitted the qualifer "including the brain stem" from the
secondary provision because the legislature intentionally included that phrase in the primary
provision of the same statute. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 46.05 (4th ed. 1984) ("To discover the true construction of any particular clause of a statute, the
first thing to be attended to... is the actual language ... ; second, the words or expressions which
obviously are by design omitted ...."). Second, one can infer that the legislature intentionally
elected not to modify the noun "brain" by the adjective "entire" in either provision - a distinct
departure from most contemporary whole-brain definitions. Id. § 52.01 ("Similar statutes of other
states comprise a type of extrinsic aid deserving special attention in the process of
interpretation.").
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illustrated by comparing Wilma Wisconsin and Oliver Ohioan - neither
of whom maintain higher-brain activity, each of whom retains brain
stem functionality, yet both of whom rely upon artificial means to sus-
tain adequate circulation and respiration.22 0 Because both Wilma and
Oliver have lost neocortical activity, neither maintains cognition or con-
sciousness and each lies motionless, save for periodic (albeit respirator-
induced) chest movements.2 2 ' Because Wilma and Oliver's brain stems
are functioning, however, both "can not only breathe, metabolize, main-
tain temperature and blood pressure, . . . on their own," but each can
"also sigh, yawn, track light with their eyes, and react to pain or reflex
stimulation. 222 Nevertheless, Oliver is dead under the Ohio statute
because his "respiratory and circulatory functions .. .are being artifi-
cially sustained," and he has experienced an "irreversible cessation of all
functions of the brain[, ineluding thc brain stcm]."223 In contrast, Wilma
is alive under Wisconsin's definitions of both somatic and brain death -
she has neither sustained an "irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions," nor has she suffered an "irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem. 224
Consequently, it would seem advisable for hopeful parents, who
wish to hold on to a persistently-vegetative child as long as possible, to
seek hospice care in a jurisdiction with an unequivocally whole-brain
definition of death - where it should be relatively more difficult to deem
their child dead than in a jurisdiction with an opaque, and possibly, par-
tial-brain definition. 25 It would seem equally reasonable, however, for
even the most loving of parents - who might prefer to accelerate their
child's impending demise, alleviate the emotional strain on family and
friends, and diminish the financial burden of ongoing medical care - to
220. See Smith, supra note 85, at 857-58.
221. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 35.
222. Id. (emphasis supplied).
223. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (1982) (stricken text is supplied to emphasize words
included in the primary provision of the Ohio statute but omitted in the secondary provision of the
same statute). In Ohio, the "irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain[, icluding tile bdiu
stem]" is the only appropriate indicia of death where a person's "respiratory and circulatory
functions ... are being artificially sustained." Id. Thus, the fact that Oliver has not experienced
an "irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions" is not germane to a
determination of whether he is alive or dead. Cf id.
224. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1982).
225. Persistently-vegetative patients "can remain biologically alive with intravenous feeding
and antibiotics for much longer periods of time than patients who have sustained whole-brain
death." Smith, supra note 85, at 857-58. Moreover, it is not unheard of for patients with
seemingly permanent neocortical or subcortical damage to even "regain spontaneous respiration
and circulation." DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 40. For example, Karen Quinlan - who was
thought to have lost higher-brain activity, but who was known to have retained brain stem
functions - survived in a persistent vegetative state, without mechanical assistance, for years after
being removed from a ventilator. Id.
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favor jurisdictions with a partial-brain formulation. Of course, an invidi-
ous remainderman or joint tenant may also benefit by a partial-brain
definition - under which it might be comparatively easy to declare a
persistently-vegetative owner dead and, thereby, expedite the devolution
of her property interest.226
C. The Anatomy of Contemporary Death Laws:
Determinative Components
The primary purpose of all death laws is to "guide those who will
decide whether (and if so, when) a person has passed from being alive to
being dead."2 7 Definitions alone, however, "offer little concrete help in
the practical task of determining whether a person has died. '228 For this
reason, most statutes also incorporate procedural rules that inform the
addressee how to employ the definitional components in a real-world
setting.229
1. DETERMINATIVE PREREQUISITES
Whereas a death law's definitional applicability enables the
addressee to anticipate what legal events might follow from one's satis-
fying the codified definition,23 ° its determinative prerequisites identify
what clinical circumstances must precede a determination of death in the
first instance. For example, the UDDA prefatorily notes that it "does not
concern itself with" matters pertaining to the "maint[enance of] life sup-
port beyond brain death in cases of ... organ donors."'2 3 1 Because this
issue is "le[ft] for other law" to resolve, 232 fourteen states either
expressly permit or explicitly prevent a person from being declared dead
unless certain conditions precedent are fulfilled.233
226. Cf RESTATEMENT (FIRST) PROP. § 18 (1936) ("An estate for life is an estate which is not
an estate of inheritance."); 7 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 52.05[2] (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2005)
("[T]he death of a spouse holding as tenant by the entirety terminates the tenancy. ); id.
§ 51.03[3] ("[Tihe estates of deceased joint tenants have no interest.").
227. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 55.
228. See Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 102.
229. See, e.g., UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr, supra note 73, § 1. This dichotomy is
exemplified by the UDDA's statutory framework. Cf id. The Act's first sentence articulates
definitional components (i.e., "An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem, is dead."). Id. The Act's second sentence ascribes determinative
components (i.e., "A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical
standards.").
230. See supra Part IV.B.1.
231. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT, supra note 73, prefatory note.
232. Id.
233. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (West 1984);
§ 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); HAw. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1998); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 446.400 (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.
20071
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The Hawaii statute, for example, requires that "[d]eath shall be pro-
nounced before artificial means of support are withdrawn and before any
vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation." '234 Aside from
providing physicians with bright-line legal guidance,235 this provision
also advances a broad-based biomedical policy objective. It is well
established that replenishing the cache of transplantable organs depends
upon public confidence that critically ill or gravely injured donors will
not receive less zealous treatment than their non-donor counterparts. 236
Therefore, by prohibiting the peri-mortem removal of life support - and,
thereby, forestalling an organ harvest so long as the donor can be kept
alive artificially - the Hawaii legislation doubles as a vehicle by which
to buttress the perceived integrity of the transplantation process.
Not all statutes, however, safeguard the legally alive patient against
the hazards of being opportunistically declared dead as a pretext for sal-
vaging her still-functioning body parts. The Alaska statute, for example,
provides that "[d]eath may be pronounced ... before artificial means of
maintaining respiratory and cardiac function are terminated. '237  Of
course, the auxiliary verb "'may' . . . does not ... ordinarily connote[ ]
language of command, ' 238 and, hence, does not mandate that death be
pronounced before life support is terminated. 39 Nevertheless, "'[m]ay'
confers a power, authority, privilege, or right"2' 4 and, thus, allows such
apparatus to be withdrawn before a person has died.241 In other words,
the Alaska legislature seemingly acquiesces in Natalie Non-donor's
being artificially kept alive as long as her insurance provider will front
the bill, yet David Donor's being disconnected as soon as a donee beck-
§ 5-202 (West 1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (West
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (1982);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 1986); TEx. HEALTH & SA'Erv CODE ANN. § 671.001
(Vernon 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West 2004).
234. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1(b) (1998) (emphasis supplied). By requiring that "[d]eath
shall be pronounced before.., any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation," id., the
Hawaii legislature effectively codified the so-called "dead-donor rule" (i.e., a basic tenet of
medical practice that eschews the removal of a person's organs before she is declared dead). See
generally Robert M. Arnold & Stuart J. Youngner, The Dead Donor Rule: Should We Stretch It,
Bend It, Or Abandon It?, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 263, 263-65 (1993).
235. See UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT § 4(a), 14 U.L.A. 485 (1995 & Supp. 1996)
("'Shall' and 'must' express a duty, obligation, requirement, or condition precedent.").
236. See DuBois, supra note 50, at 132-33.
237. ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995) (emphasis supplied).
238. GARNER, supra note 184, at 502.
239. Cf ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995). In other words, because "[d]eath may be
pronounced . . . before artificial means of maintaining respiratory and cardiac function are
terminated," id., "[d]eath [need not] be pronounced ... before artificial means of maintaining
respiratory and cardiac function are terminated." Cf id.
240. UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT § 4(b), 14 U.L.A. 485 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
241. Cf ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995).
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ons.242  Given the potential for such life-or-death disparity, it would
seem sensible for a "donor-to-be" to consider - prior to granting dona-
tive consent - whether the controlling death law in her jurisdiction rele-
gates a donor's welfare to that of a subordinate variable in the supply-
and-demand computation that facilitates organ transplantation.243
To be sure, "[t]he real safeguard against doctors killing patients is
not to be found in a statute 'defining' death.' Rather, protection
against clinical skullduggery "inheres in physicians' ethical and relig-
ious beliefs, which are also embodied in the fundamental professional
ethic of primum non nocere and are reinforced by homicide and 'wrong-
ful death' laws and the rules governing medical negligence applicable in
license revocation proceedings or in private actions for damages. '"245
Nevertheless, two jurisdictions' death laws expressly address such
matters.246
The Oklahoma statute, for example, prohibits a determination of
death until after "all reasonable attempts to restore [the patient's] sponta-
neous circulatory or respiratory functions" have proven futile.247
Implicit in this proviso are two corollary propositions: (1) a physician
must affirmatively undertake resuscitative measures; and (2) a patient
must be irrevivable before she is deemed to have died. The moribund
Oklahoman, therefore, can rest assured that all feasible measures will be
taken to keep her alive - regardless of the physician's ex ante estimation
regarding the efficacy of such procedures. 248 The Virginia statute also
obliges a physician to confirm, before determining her patient to be
brain dead, that 'further attempts at resuscitation or continued support-
ive maintenance" would be unavailing. 249 Here, the legislature's use of
the word "further" achieves the same result (albeit, implicitly) as the
parallel Oklahoma provision; a patient must not only be irrevivable
before she is declared brain dead, but her physician must also have
exhausted all reasonable resuscitative procedures.
242. Cf id.
243. Cf UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(e), 8A U.L.A. 24 (1987) ("An anatomical gift by
will takes effect upon death of the testator, whether or not the will is probated."); id. § 20 ("[A]
technician may remove any donated [body] parts ... after determination of death by a physician
or surgeon."). Tangentially, one could surmise that a statutory provision which acquiesces in
donors receiving less zealous treatment than their non-donor counterparts directly reduces the
number of willing donors and, thereby, indirectly decreases the supply of available organs. See
DuBois, supra note 50, at 132-33.
244. Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 116.
245. Id.
246. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West
2004).
247. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 1986).
248. Cf id.
249. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West 2004) (emphasis supplied).
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For purposes of determining somatic death, however, the Virginia
statute only asks the physician to opine that "attempts at resuscitation
would not . . . be successful in restoring spontaneous life-sustaining
functions."' 0 A strict reading of this language suggests that compliance
therewith does not require that an attempt be made to revive a patient
before concluding that she is dead. On the contrary, it seems that
whether a patient will be resuscitated is entirely discretionary - a deci-
sion that hinges upon "the clinical skills and judgment of the p[hysician]
making the determination,"25 ' as well as her ethical proclivities, relig-
ious beliefs, and sentiments towards euthanasia. The Oklahoma physi-
cian is thus given the clear statutory directive that determining a patient
to be dead is an option of last resort, 2 5 2 whereas the Virginia physician is
left only with the responsibility of applying usual and customary stan-
dards of prudent medical practice on a case-by-case basis.253
2. DETERMINATIVE INVOLVEMENT
Because most deaths in the United States are determined by appli-
cation of the traditional heart-lung definition,254 and its indicia are easily
ascertainable by most laymen, the UDDA does not prescribe who can or
cannot determine whether a person is dead.255 Nevertheless, fifteen
jurisdictions specifically identify whether (and to what extent) profes-
sional oversight is required to legally declare that death has occurred.25 6
Seven states require that at least one physician be in attendance when
250. Id. (emphasis supplied).
251. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 76-77.
252. Cf OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (1986).
253. Cf VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004).
254. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, prefatory note.
255. Id. § I. The UDDA does mandate, however, that "determination[s] of death ... be made
in accordance with accepted medical standards." Id. In this regard, one could argue that only a
physician is capable of applying standards of medical practice in the first instance, or that a
physician's involvement is itself an accepted medical standard. The Arkansas Attorney General,
for example, opined that a determination of death relates to the practice of medicine and,
therefore, can only be only performed by a licensed physician. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-102
(1984), available at 1984 WL 63282. Then again, the New York Attorney General drew a
contrary inference, interpreting a lack of statutory guidance to mean that "no one is either
authorized by law or regulation to pronounce death or prohibited by law or regulation from
pronouncing death." N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. (Inf.) 185 (1980), available at 1980 WL 107259.
256. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1760 (2005);
§ 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1
(1998); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 446.400 (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001);
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.1033 (West 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (West 1982); 35 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 450.507 (West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-511 (2005); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 67 1.001 (Vernon 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004). In Maryland,
the only statute that mandates professional involvement in determinations of death is a
Correctional Services Article - requiring that a lethal injection persist until "a licensed physician
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brain death is declared; 25 7 three require the presence of no less than two
licensed doctors when doing so. 25 8  A Registered Nurse ("RN") is
authorized to determine death in seven jurisdictions;259 an Emergency
Medical Technician ("EMT"), in just one.26 °
Whereas a physician's involvement may be more a formality than a
necessity in the traditional heart-lung context, determining whether a
person is brain dead often "require[s] sophisticated intervention to elicit
latent signs of life."'26' And yet, just four statutes distinguish between
cardiopulmonary and neurological diagnoses for purposes of delimiting
who may perform the latter.2 62 Only one state statutorily compels a
"personal examination of the individual believed to be dead, 2 63 another
calls for the physician merely to "conduct[ ] a [confirmatory] test" to
establish that a patient is no longer alive.26'
The Virginia statute, however, exemplifies the legislative distances
a jurisdiction will travel to secure the public's confidence in the conclu-
sion that a person is brain dead.265 On the one hand, every determina-
tion of death - be it based upon heart-lung or brain-based criteria -
requires the involvement of at least one "physician duly authorized to
pronounces [the prisoner's] death according to accepted standards of medical practice." MD.
CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3-905 (West 1999).
257. See DEL. CODE ArN. tit. 24, § 1760 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1720 (2006); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 90-323 (West 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (West 1982); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon 1995).
258. See § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1998); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 446.400 (West 1986).
259. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 327C-1 (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1033 (West 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 632.474 (2005); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 450.507 (West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-
511 (2005).
260. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995) ("An individual is considered dead if, in the
opinion of a mobile intensive care paramedic, . . . or emergency medical technician," the
physiological criteria are satisfied), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1760 (2005) ("A determination
of death . . . may be made by a person certified to practice medicine . . . by . . . the use of
information provided by an EMT-P (paramedic) using telemetric or transtelephonic means."). In
1978, the Florida Attorney General opined that EMTs are not vested with authority to determine
death absent express statutory authorization to do so. 1978 Fla. Op. Atty. Gen. 104, available at
1978 WL 24675.
261. Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 113.
262. See § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-3 (West 1991); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004).
263. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1760 (2005). Fortunately, the New Jersey Board of Medical
Examiners at least reminds physicians to "proceed without inordinate delay to the location of the
presumed decedent and ... make [a] proper determination and pronouncement of [her] death."
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:35-6.2 (1995).
264. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (West 1982).
265. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004).
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practice medicine in th[e] Commonwealth." '66 For purposes of declar-
ing brain death, on the other hand, the attending physician must not only
"be duly licensed" as "a specialist in the field of neurology, neurosur-
gery, or electroencephalography," but "another [consulting] physician
and [the attending] neurospecialist" must produce concurring diagnoses
based upon "the absence of brain stem reflexes, spontaneous brain func-
tions and spontaneous respiratory functions[,] and the patient's medical
record. 267
In stark contrast to these relatively strict procedural requirements
stand the relatively lenient restrictions imposed by the Alaska statute.268
While Alaska's legislation does mandate professional involvement in
determining death, any "physician licensed or exempt from licensing
.... or a[n authorized] registered nurse . . . . or . . . a[n authorized]
mobile intensive care paramedic, physician assistant, or emergency med-
ical technician" may do so.2 69 Virginia also allows non-physicians to
pronounce death - the means by which the statute does so, however, is
seemingly spurious and arguably disingenuous. 270 An RN or Physician
Assistant ("PA") may pronounce death in Virginia, but only if. (1) the
RN or PA is employed by a home health organization, hospice, a hospi-
tal, or nursing home; and (2) the RN or PA is "directly involved in the
care of the patient"; and (3) "the patient's death has occurred";27' and
(4) "the patient is under the care of a physician when his death occurs";
and (5) "the patient's death has been anticipated"; and (6) "the physician
is unable to be present within a reasonable period of time to determine
death"; and (7) "there is a valid Do Not Resuscitate Order. ' 272 In light
of the relatively small percentage of plausible scenarios that might
simultaneously satisfy all seven conjuncts of the Virginia statute, one
must ask whether its drafters garnered a genuine desire for determina-
tions of death to be made by non-physicians on a regular (or even an ad
hoc) basis.
3. DETERMINATIVE CRITERIA
Consistent with the UDDA's objective of designating a "general
legal standard" for determining death, the Act does not delimit the spe-
266. Id.
267. Id. (emphasis supplied).
268. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004), with Alaska Stat. § 09.68.120 (1995).
269. ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995).
270. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004).
271. One cannot help but relish the tautological absurdity of this legislative legerdemain.
Permitting an RN or PA to "pronounce death if... the patient's death has occurred" merely begs
the question advanced in the first instance by the statute's title: "[W]hen [is a] person deemed
medically and legally dead"? VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004).
272. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004).
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cific "diagnostic tests and medical procedures" by which to do So. 2 73 In
point of fact, only the territory of Guam has codified a detailed clinical
methodology.274 Most statutes, however, are simply pegged to one of
eight professional standards of care. Thirty-three jurisdictions follow
the UDDA's mandate that a determination "be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards"; 2 75 two call for "current" acceptance;
27 6
one, only "general. 277 Six states oblige that such standards be "ordi-
nary" ;278 three urge they be "usual and customary. '"279 One requires
they be "reasonable"; 280 another, simply "recognized"; 28 and a last only
asks that they at least be "acceptable. 282
At first blush it may appear that each variant contemplates only
practices that have "passed the normal test of scrutiny and adoption by
273. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, prefatory note.
274. See GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 83C101 (2005) ("Irreversibility of loss of brain function
is declared if the following are satisfied: (a) the cause of coma should be established and sufficient
to account for the loss of brain function ... ; (b) reversible conditions ... and drug intoxication
must be excluded; . . . (c) loss of brain function should persist for a period of twenty-four (24)
hours; and (d) an EEG confirmation of neocortical death is optional.").
275. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, supra note 73, § I (emphasis supplied); accord
ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (2000); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-1107 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-
17-101 (1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
36-136 (West 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 1760 (2005); D.C. CODE § 7-601 (1982); § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 54-1819 (1981); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/10 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-4-3
(West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (West 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811
(1983); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.1033 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.135 (West
1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 71-7202 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.007 (West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 141-D:2 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-3 (West 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (West
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.3-01 (1989);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (West 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122 (West 1986);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.300 (West 1987); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10203 (West 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-4-16 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-460 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-25-18.1
(1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-34-2 (West 2007); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1981); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-1 (West 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 146.71 (West 1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-19-101 (1985). Not surprisingly, the Model
Determination of Death Act advanced by the AMA mandated that a determination of death be
"made in accordance with accepted medical standards." 243 JAMA 420 (1980) (emphasis
supplied).
276. See § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-3 (West 1991).
277. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.135 (West 1989).
278. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202 (West 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004).
279. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1819 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.400 (West 1986);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 194.005 (West 1982).
280. See § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987).
281. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1992).
282. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995).
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the biomedical community." '283 Surprisingly, however, it is arguable
whether some articulations even require that a procedure "has been
accepted by a substantial and reputable body" of practitioners.284 For
example, the Florida statute qualifies the UDDA formulation and man-
dates that a "determination of death ...be made in accordance with
currently accepted [and] reasonable medical standards. ' 285  Alaska's
legislation, in contrast, allows diagnoses to be "based on acceptable
medical standards. 286 Idaho goes so far as to condone mere conformity
with "the usual and customary procedures of the community in which
the determination .. .is made. 287
On the one hand, it is entirely reasonable to infer that every cur-
rently "accepted" practice was, at some earlier stage, considered suffi-
ciently "acceptable" to confront the test of peer scrutiny. On the other
hand, it is wholly unrealistic to conclude that every practice that is tenta-
tively considered "acceptable" will inevitably survive peer scrutiny and
become "accepted." Furthermore, a procedure that is "customary" in a
particular regional community need not be "ordinary" in the medical
community at large. One must wonder, then, what are the "acceptable"
(but not yet "accepted") practices that a physician in Alaska (but not in
Florida) may employ? Similarly, what regionally "customary" (but not
nationally "ordinary") procedures may only an Idaho physician follow?
Inasmuch as the answers to these questions are uncertain, the result of
this statutory interplay is quite clear. The degree to which death can be
uniformly determined is a function of the degree to which the diagnostic
tests for doing so are universally accepted.
Whether (and, if so, to what extent) disparity among professional
practices actually exists is beyond the scope of this Note. Anecdotal
evidence suggests, however, that the same person can be determined
283. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 78.
284. Id. at 79.
285. § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987) (emphasis supplied). Query against whose standard of
reasonableness the Florida statute is benchmarked. Cf DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 78. Is
a standard "reasonable" so long as the attending physician or "an expert medical witness ... who
is a competent clinician and is experienced [with] ...determination[s] of death" so testifies?
Meyers, supra note 40, § 19. Or, is it possible for a hindsight-biased assessment by lay jurors to
find that "a medical practice, although generally adopted," is nevertheless "unreasonable"?
DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 78. If the latter is possible, one might speculate whether a
physician who practices in a jurisdiction that requires objectively reasonable standards for
determining death is more exposed to malpractice liability than her counterparts in jurisdictions
that permit subjectively recognized standards. Indeed, many statutes only provide immunity from
"damages in any civil action or .. . [from] prosecution in any criminal proceeding" if the
challenged "determination [is made] in accordance with the Act." See UNIF. DEMERMINATION OF
DEATH Acr, supra note 73, prefatory note.
286. ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995) (emphasis supplied).
287. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1819 (1981) (emphasis supplied).
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dead according to Accepted Medical Practice X, yet be determined alive
pursuant to Accepted Medical Practice 11288 - both findings being
equally compliant with a statute that is benchmarked against "accepted
medical standards." Moreover, varied "local, regional, or national stan-
dards or guidelines" are promulgated by various "medical societ[ies],
hospital association[s]. . . .institution[s], or other recognized group[s]
... dealing with the criteria to be utilized or referred to in ascertaining
[the] time and occurrence of death. '289 Consequently, it would seem
advisable for a vitally-driven patient who wishes to be kept alive as long
as possible to seek treatment in a jurisdiction that will require her death
be determined strictly according to "approved" or "currently accepted"
medical procedures.29 ° Contrarily, financially motivated devisees who
scheme to hasten a testator's demise might favor (or even leverage) a
death law that leniently condones diagnostic tests which are "ordinary"
or merely "acceptable. 29 1
V. BEYOND THE VEIL OF THE UDDA
From ashes to ashes, from dust to dust - our analysis revisits the
question from whence it came: how does the corpus of American death
laws operate as a system?
It is undeniable that all death laws share a common objective. Each
represents a statutory "guide [for] those who will decide whether (and if
so, when) a person has passed from being alive to being dead. 292 But
are these laws symmetrical? No. Instead, the end-of-life situations
encompassed by one jurisdiction's codification do not necessarily coin-
cide with those of another,293 and similar end-of-life scenarios are often
excluded or included by different legislative models. 294 Are these laws
harmonious? Quite the contrary. Rather, statutes based upon theoreti-
288. See generally INST. OF MED., supra note 50.
289. See Meyers, supra note 40, § 13. Because procedures for determining death are
responsive to "geographic variations in medical practice, local custom, differences in demographic
and social characteristics," INST. OF MED., supra note 50, at 47, the uniformity achieved by the
UDDA should not be viewed as a unifying distinction between life and death. Rather, the Act
arguably ensures only a consistent application of the particular diagnostic tests accepted by the
particular medical community within the particular jurisdiction where the particular
determination of death is made.
290. Cf. § 382.009, FLA. STAT. (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.135 (West 1989); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:6A-3 (West 1991).
291. Cf ALASKA STAT. § 09.68.120 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1998); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202 (West 1998); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 90-323 (West 1979); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001 (Vernon
1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2004).
292. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 32, at 55.
293. See supra Part IV.C.l.
294. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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cally analogous grounds do not generate congruent results,295 and indi-
viduals with identical physiological conditions are frequently deemed
alive or dead by divergent legislative formulations.2 96 In sum, just
because our common understanding of death might suggest that a person
should still be alive, a concomitant determination is commonly prohib-
ited - or an inapposite determination is regularly permitted - by the
controlling law.2 97
Of course, death must come to all living beings - sometimes
sooner, sometimes later, but always sometime, "any laws to the contrary
notwithstanding."2 98 Yet, one's passing not only impacts her personal
relationship with those who survive, but also affects the legal relation-
ships among the survivors themselves.2 99  "[Olur dying," in other
words, "is [frequently] more a concern to those who survive us than to
ourselves."30 The antinomy of state statutes, however, affords a "dece-
dent-to-be," as well as her "soon-to-be-survivors," an array of starting-
points - each endowed with unique advantages and disadvantages -
from which to launch the legal machinery that a pronouncement of death
ignites. But any one alternative is not advantageous in a vacuum; nor is
any one alternative disadvantageous because it fails to vindicate applica-
ble norms. Rather, the prescient legal advisor must answer a critical
question as to each client: whether and when, in the context of this per-
son's particular objectives, would deeming her to be legally dead
"seem[] the best thing to do"?3 0' Only after one knows what would be
best (i.e., whether a person is wanted dead and/or alive) can calculated
end-of-life maneuvers ensure the favorable application, or avoid the
unfavorable applicability, of particular legal standards for defining and
determining death. For only then does any one alternative become
favorable, and thereby advantageous, or unfavorable, and thereby disad-
vantageous, in the first instance.
Certainly, relocating a "soon-to-be-decedent" from one state to
another is the most obvious expedient for invoking a particular jurisdic-
tion's death laws. Yet, the Uniform Probate Code affords a significantly
less disruptive, private-ordering alternative. Section 2-703 empowers a
testator to designate that "the law of a particular state" shall govern
"[t]he meaning and legal effect" of her will "without regard to the loca-
295. See supra Part IV.C.3.
296. See supra Part IV.B.3.
297. See supra Part IV.B.2.
298. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (repealed 1984), amended by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205
(1984).
299. See supra notes 2-26 and accompanying text.
300. MANN, supra note 1.
301. Dworkin, supra note 37, at 629.
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tion of property covered thereby."302 It would thus appear that a domi-
ciliary of State X could legitimately incorporate a choice-of-law
provision in her will that ensures the term "death" will be interpreted
and construed "in accordance with [State Y's] rules of construction. 3 °3
Consequently, if a domiciliary of State X is not legally dead pursuant to
the laws of State Y, and also has a will which instructs that its "meaning
and effect" shall be governed by the laws of State Y, then probating her
will or administering her estate would be impermissible - even though
she might be legally dead according to the laws of State X.3° Indeed,
"[p]ost-mortem probate of a will must occur to make [it] effective" and
"appointment of a personal representative.., after the decedent's death
is required" 30 5 to issue the letters testamentary that commence adminis-
tration 0.3 6 Likewise, if a domiciliary of State Y is legally dead pursuant
to the laws of State X and also has a will which instructs that its "mean-
ing and effect" shall be governed by the laws of State X, then probating
her will and administering her estate would be permissible - even
though she might be legally alive according to the laws of State y.3 07
It is understandable why some perceive this oblique state of affairs
as, at best, unsettling or, at worst, unsavory. It is disconcerting to imag-
ine that our statutory regime would (or even could) militate against our
shared understanding of life. Yet, every statute that regulates death inev-
itably vitiates its electorate's preconceptions of what it means to be alive
- at least insofar as those precepts are inconsistent with the legislature's
opinion of what it means to be dead.308 And, so long as one state's
lawmakers disagree with their sister-state counterparts, our statutory
regime will continue to distinguish "different 'kinds' of death, '30 9 desig-
nate "the same person 'dead' for one purpose [yet] 'alive' for
302. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-703 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 186 (1969); accord
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 240(1) (1971) ("A will insofar as it devises an
interest in land is construed in accordance with the rules of construction of the state designated for
this purpose in the will."); id. § 264(1) ("A will insofar as it bequeaths an interest in movables is
construed in accordance with the local law of the state designated for this purpose in the will.").
303. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 264 cmt. e (1971) ("[wlhen the testator
designates the law of a state as the applicable law in matters of construction, it is to be inferred
that he intends the local law of that state to govern" regardless of whether the forum "ha[s] a
substantial relationship to the testator or his estate").
304. Cf UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. III gen. cmt. (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 26 (1969).
305. Id. (emphasis supplied).
306. See id. §§ 3-103 to -104.
307. Cf id. art. III gen. cmt.
308. UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. § 2 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 483 (1995 & Supp. 1996) ("A word
or phrase defined in a statute ... has the meaning expressed in its definition and therefore that
meaning prevails over other meanings." (emphasis supplied)).
309. DEFININc DEATH, supra note 32, at 60.
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another, 3 10 and deem "some people 'more dead' than others."31'
This legislative disagreement, however, is not necessarily disagree-
able. For, whether it is desirable (or undesirable) that a person can be
simultaneously dead and alive pursuant to the laws of State X and State
Y respectively cannot be answered by normative referents alone. Rather,
the desirability of statutorily resurrecting a "putative decedent" from
State X merely by applying the laws of State Y, or of statutorily making
moribund a "potential decedent" from State Y simply by applying the
laws of State X, depends upon the desirability of her being deemed to
have died in the first instance. It is this purposive inquiry alone that
"places the issue of death into the only posture in which it can be of
relevance to the law - the posture of context or consequences. '"312
310. Id.
311. Capron & Kass, supra note 62, at 106.
312. Dworkin, supra note 37, at 629.
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FIGURE 1. THE ANATOMY OF CONTEMPORARY DEATH LAWS
3 13
313. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 2. THE PROLIFERATION OF CONTEMPORARY DEATH LAWS3 14
Official adoption of the UDDA as originally drafted by the NCCUSL (15)
Official adoption of the UDDA with substantive modifications (18)
Non-UDDA legislation (14)
No death legislation enacted as of April 1, 2007 (4)
314. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
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